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ABSTRACT
This study examined the potential of social conflict
related to private and public rights, to constrain
aquaculture on Cape Cod. While the ability of social
conflict to constrain aquaculture has been demonstrated in a
few cases, its current potential to constrain aquaculture on
Cape Cod had not been established prior to this study. This
study was based on information gathered from town records
and public hearings related to proposed aquaculture
ventures. In addition, town officials were interviewed to
obtain additional information related to cases. The finding
of this study is that private riparian proprietors, and
interests in shellfishing tend to constrain aquaculture on
Cape Cod today. This study utilized the qualitative case
study method described by Merriam (1988).
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INTRODUCTION
Aquaculture on Cape Cod occurs primarily in sheltered
ernbaYrnents. Tideflats and productive shellfish growing
waters make these areas prime locations for the shellfish
culture operations that characterize aquaculture on Cape
Cod. However, public rights in navigation and fishing also
exist in the waters of these ernbaYrnents. In addition,
private riparian property is often the dominant
characteristic of the shore; unique to Massachusetts,
private riparian proprietors may have fee simple ownership
of tideflats adjacent to their upland property. This is the
setting in which aquaculture on Cape Cod occurs, and from
which arise social conflicts that potentially limit its
growth.
The problem of social conflict as a constraint to
aquaculture is well documented. It has been contended that
aquaculture is possible where progressive attitudes exist,
but can be constrained where the concept of private control
of public resources is opposed (Mattheissen, 1992, p.27).
The magnitude of public concern over aesthetic impacts of
aquaculture has been related to the sociopolitical climate
of a community (Chew, 1993, p.37). In Atlantic Canada,
policy makers consider the rights of adjacent riparian land
owners, and social acceptability by the local community, in
aquaculture siting decisions (Wildsmith, 1992).
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However, other factors may be considered, with the
status quo maintained to reduce conflict (Wildsmith, 1992,
p.27). This scenario is not unfamiliar on Cape Cod. In
some cases, various interest groups may generate sufficient
opposition to cause the denial of proposed aquaculture
ventures, that had the preliminary support of local
officials (Merrit, 1996). In other cases, a single interest
group may be the source of such opposition (Moore, 1995).
In addition, the potential for social conflict in some towns
has resulted in the underutilization of certain areas that
are suitable for aquaculture (Somerville, 1996). It has
become apparent to various towns on Cape Cod that an ad hoc
approach to aquaculture is counter productive; planned
development that considers the potential for social conflict
has reaped benefits were it has been applied (Benjamin,
1996) .
It is assumed that the potential for social conflict is
inherent among user groups that compete with aquaculture for
coastal resources. This study attempts to determine the
current potential for social conflict by examining factors
that may lessen or intensify the assumed inherent potential
for social conflict. Sources of social conflict are
identified and analyses of the potential for social conflict
are conducted for each town on Cape Cod.
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colonial ordinance of 1647" (East Boston Co.
v.Commonwealth 89 N.E. Rep. 236, 1909).
While this settled the instant case, it did not provide a
precise definition of the term "low water mark" as used in
the Colony Ordinance of 1647. The precedent value of such a
definition is evident. However, the SJC was slow to address
this issue. For example, in Seawall & Day Cordage Co. v.
Boston Water Power Co. (147 Mass. 61, 1888) the SJC ruled
that this term referred to the extreme low water line, again
without providing a more precise definition.
The SJC finally established a precise definition for
the term "extreme low water" in Rockwood v. Snow Inn Corp
(566 N.E. 2d 608 Mass. 1991). The dispute in this case was
whether a proposed expansion of the Snow Inn violated a
zoning bylaw in the town of Harwich. The defendant argued
that the expansion was lawful because it would cover less
than 15% of the property as required under the bylaw.
However, this calculation included a boundary that located
the seaward extent of the defendant's tideflats at the
lowest level ever reached by the sea at that location. The
reasoning for this boundary was based on the SJC's ambiguous
ruling in Sewall & Day Cordage Co. v. Boston Water Power Co.
(147 Mass. 61, 1888).
In rejecting the defendant's claim, the SJC reviewed
the precedent for its ruling in Sewall & Day Cordage Co. v.
Boston Water Power Co. (147 Mass. 61, 1888). While agreeing
that the extreme low water line was the correct seaward
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boundary of private tideflats in Massachusetts, the SJC
cited Storer v. Freeman (6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 435, 1810) to
establish the basis for its decision in the instant case. In
Storer v. Freeman (6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 435, 1810), the SJC
ruled that the term "low water mark", as promulgated in the
Colony Ordinance of 1647, meant the ordinary low water line.
This was apparently reinterpreted in Sparhawk v. Bullard (1
Met. 95 1840) in which the SJC ruled:
"The object of the ordinance ... was to give the
proprietors ... convenient wharf-privileges, to
enjoy which, to the best advantage, it is often
necessary to extend their wharves to the low-water
mark at such times when the tide ebbs the lowest"
(Sparhawk v. Bullard 1 Met. 95 1840).
However, as Sparhawk v. Bullard (1 Met. 95 1840) cited
Storer v. Freeman (6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 435, 1810), in the
instant case the SJC ruled that its intent in Sparhawk must
have been to affirm its ruling in Storer. Nonetheless,
subsequent courts treated the Sparhawk ruling as a
divergence, which partly led to the dispute in the instant
case. However, this inconsistency was eliminated when the
SJC reversed its earlier ruling in Sparhawk:
"Although neither the ordinance nor Storer
suggested a formula or specified the criteria for
identifying the exact location of an ordinary low
water mark, it is entirely clear that the court
did not have in mind as the relevant low water
mark a line reflecting the lowest level that the
sea might ever have reached for any reason"
(Rockwood v. Snow Inn Corp. 566 N.E. 2d 608 Mass.
612, 1991).
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2. Rules for Dividing Private Tideflats
The common characteristic of the following cases is
that each involves the dividing of tideflats between
coterminous private riparian proprietors. For the purpose
of this study, this section is limited to a discussion of
the various rules for dividing tideflats that emerged from
these cases. This approach provides a comprehensive outline
of the current legal framework for dividing tideflats in
Massachusetts.
In Rust v. Boston Mill Corporation (6 pick. 158, 1828)
the SJC established the legal basis for dividing private
tideflats in Massachusetts:
"The (Colony Ordinance of 1647) relates to the
owners of upland all around the cove, and it
intends that the exterior lines of their flats
shall be at right angles with the their upland"
(Rust v. Boston Mill Corporation 6 pick. 164-165,
1828) .
However, the disputed tideflats in this case were located in
a circular cove, and applying the preceding rule in such a
case would result in the overlapping of dividing lines.
Recognizing this, the SJC commented:
"I am aware that coves and creeks may be so
irregularly formed as to render this or any other
mode of dividing the flats according to the
ordinance difficult, if not impracticable;" (Rust
v. Boston Mill Corporation 6 pick. 168, 1828).
The solution in this case was to draw converging lines in a
seaward direction from the corners of the upland portion of
the private riparian property. To illustrate the outcome of
27
such a division the SJC provided a hypothetical example of
its application:
"Thus in the case of a circular cove in which
there is no natural channel, if a straight line
across the mouth of the cove is 100 rods in length
and the circular line high-water mark is 200, each
owner of a lot abutting on the cove is entitled to
run his lines from the two corners of his lot in a
direction towards low-water mark, so as to include
a parcel of flats, which at the mouth of the cove
will be one half the width of the lot at high-
water mark; and thus each will hold his share in
several" (Rust v. Boston Mill Corporation 6 pick.
158, 1828).
The result is that each private riparian proprietor receives
a wedge shaped parcel of tideflats. Thus, it is necessary
to diverge from the "right angle" rule when the shape of the
coastline does not at least approximate a straight line.
While the resultant seaward frontage is less than the upland
frontage, each private riparian proprietor receives a
proportionate share of the tideflats within the cove.
Applying this rule in the case of a convex headland,
essentially the opposite of a circular cove, would require
that diverging lines be drawn in a seaward direction from
the two corners of a parcel of private riparian property.
This would result in a seaward boundary line that is greater
than the boundary line at the mean high water line.
Nonetheless, it could result in an equitable division of
tideflats between private riparian proprietors.
That this represented a new rule for dividing tideflats
was affirmed in the SJC in the case of Walker v. The Boston
& Maine Railroad (3 Cush., 1, 21, 1849). The terminus of
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private ownership in tideflats was determined to be a creek
from which the tide did not fully ebb. Because its shape
was irregular, applying the rule taken from the Colony
Ordinance of 1647 would have resulted in an inequitable
division of tideflats. In addressing this point, the SJC
ruled:
" ... the most that can be done is, to take the
colony ordinance ... and apply it according to its
true spirit, and by as near an approximation as
practicable to the rules which have been
judicially established, to lay down such a line of
division, as to give to each riparian proprietor
his fair and equal share" (Walker v. The Boston &
Maine Railroad 3 Cush. 1, 21, 1849).
In effect, this is the paramount principle for dividing
private tideflats in Massachusetts. It should be noted that
the SJC's ruling included the establishment of an artificial
straight terminal line along the creek. This was because a
strict application of existing rules for dividing tideflats
was impossible.
In summation, the division of all tideflats in
Massachusetts is based upon the following rules. All of
these rules do not necessarily apply in every conceivable
case. Rather, they exhaust all possibilities that result in
an equitable division of tideflats between coterminous
private riparian proprietors:
1. Dividing lines should proceed seaward
perpendicular to the mean high water line, with
the result that the length of the terminal line of
private ownership in tideflats is equal to the
proportionate length of each claimants property
along the mean high water line (Right Angle Rule:
Straight Coastlines) .
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2. The seaward boundary line should be
proportionate to the mean high water line,
according to the proportion of each private
riparian proprietor's property along the common
mean high water line (Proportionate Rule: All
Coastline Types) .
3. In the case of a convoluted coastline or
terminal line of ownership in tideflats,
artificial straight lines may be drawn, to provide
reference points for dividing lines. Depending
upon the overall shape of the common coastline
held by coterminous private riparian proprietors,
the dividing lines may be at right angles to the
coastline, or converge or diverge from it
(Baseline Rule: Potentially All Coastline Types) .
With respect to aquaculture, the value of this discussion is
that it provides methods for identifying public tideflats.
Because the wording of title deeds in private riparian
property may alienate the adjacent tideflats, such tideflats
may be a public trust area under the Colony Ordinance of
1647. The value of knowing the methods for dividing private
tideflats is that the precise boundaries of such public
trust areas can be ascertained. In addition, if such
tideflats extended beyond 1650 feet from the mean high water
line they would be a public trust area throughout their
entirety, while adjacent private tideflats would only extend
to 1650 feet.
E. Aquaculture: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
The SJC has adjudicated several questions regarding
aquaculture, but none more important than those in Wellfleet
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v. Glaze (403 Mass. 79, 525 N.E.2d 1988) and Pazzolt v.
Director of the Division of Marine Fisheries (417 Mass. 565,
1994). The SJC's ruling in the former case set the stage
for a ruling that was detrimental to aquaculture in the
latter case. Both cases are discussed in this section.
In Wellfleet v. Glaze (403 Mass. 79, 525 N.E.2d 1988),
the SJC faced a question regarding the meaning of G.L. c.130
s.67, which was part of the statutory law governing
aquaculture. The town of Wellfleet contended that the major
purpose of the provision was to prevent environmental
damage, as it provided penalties for whoever:
" ... in any way disturbs the growth of the
shellfish thereon or whoever discharges any
substance which may directly or indirectly injure
the shellfish upon any such grounds or beds,
without the consent of the licensee ... " (G.L.
c.130 s.67).
As such, the town further contended that the defendant's act
of mooring his boats on tideflats wherein an aquaculture
operation existed was a violation of the statute. However,
the defendant had a fee simple title in the tideflats. On a
question as to whether the defendant's action constituted an
interference with the public right to an easement in
shellfishing on private tideflats, the SJC answered:
"The defendant has the right to use the land in a
manner not inconsistent with the public's
reasonable use of the area for shellfishing. The
allegations of this complaint, however, are that
the defendant interfered with the practice of
aquaculture on the flats and with pens and mesh
used in that practice" (Wellfleet v. Glaze 403
Mass. 79, 81, 525 N.E. 2d 1298, 1998).
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Based upon this distinction, the SJC ruled against the
town's contention regarding the purpose of G.L. c.130 s.67.
In reaching its decision, the SJC cited a report on the
status of the state's shellfisheries:
" ... which speaks of shellfish as a State asset and
which proposes the system of private licensing now
at issue to cure the 'almost complete exhaustion
of the shellfish supply in certain areas', it
cannot be that the major purpose of behind s.67 is
the protection of the environment ... " (Report on
the Mollusk Fisheries of Massachusetts, H.R. Doc.
No. 1320, 1909).
While this defeated the town's contention, the more
important aspect of this case regarding aquaculture is the
SJC's opinion regarding the distinction between the public
right to an easement in shellfishing, and aquaculture. The
SJC ruled that aquaculture is fundamentally distinguishable
from shellfishing. As such, it was ruled that it is
equivalent to farming, and can not be considered a
derivative of the public right to an easement in
shellfishing as understood in the Colony Ordinance of 1647.
The significance of this opinion is that it was decisive in
the following case.
The decision of the SJC in Pazzolt v. Director of the
Division of Marine Fisheries (417 Mass. 565, 1994),
essentially invalidated a significant portion of the
aquaculture industry on Cape Cod today. The dispute in this
case was decided on two questions. Regarding the first
question, the SJC was asked to decide if the plaintiff owned
the tideflats upon which the defendant's aquaculture
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operation was located. The second question was related to
the legal status of aquaculture in Massachusetts: is
aquaculture a derivative of the public right to an easement
in shellfishing on private tideflats?
The dispute centered on an aquaculture operation in
Truro. The plaintiff argued that the SJC should return a
positive finding for the first point and a negative finding
for the second. The defendant argued the opposite on both
points. In his arguments on the first point, the defendant
claimed that the wording in one of the plaintiff's title
deeds to the adjacent upland proved that the tideflats had
been alienated. He presented as evidence the phrase "to the
highwater mark in Provincetown Harbor." However, this
phrase was found in only one of a succession of related
deeds that each contained the phrase "to the sea." On this
evidence, the SJC ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
This ruling and the opinion in Wellfleet v. Glaze (403
Mass. 79, 81, 525 N.E. 2d 1298, 1988), that aquaculture is
not a derivative of the public right to an easement in
shellfishing on private tideflats, rendered the defendant's
arguments groundless. In affirming this opinion, the SJC
ruled that:
"Activities which have been classified as
reasonably related to the public's right to fish
are those which are necessary or incidental to the
right to fish" (Pazzolt v. Director of the
Division of Marine Fisheries 417 Mass. 565, 1994).
33
The outcome with respect to the aquaculture operation was
that it was discontinued. This case represents perhaps the
most significant constraint to aquaculture on Cape Cod. In
Wellfleet, some aquaculturists have been notified by private
riparian proprietors to vacate their tideflats. In one
case, an aquaculture operation had been located on a private
riparian proprietor's tideflats for about 20 years prior to
the Pazzolt case (Somerville, 1996). Litigation may result
in this case. One of the potential bases for challenging
the SJC's decision in the Pazzolt case would be the fact
that in Wellfleet v. Glaze (403 Mass. 79, 81, 525 N.E. 2d
1298, 1988), the SJC did not hand down a decision regarding
the legal status of aquaculture; the comment regarding the
legal status of aquaculture was only an opinion. An
additional impact of Pazzolt v. Director of the Division of
Marine Fisheries (417 Mass. 565, 1994) is that the town of
Wellfleet has adopted a de facto policy to avoid siting




THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR AQUACULTURE
A. Introduction
Because aquaculture on Cape Cod occurs in public trust
areas, it is subject to federal and state regulation. In
addition, municipalities in Massachusetts have the authority
to license aquaculture operations under Chapter 130 section
57 of the General Laws of Massachusetts of 1994. The
following discussion illustrates federal and state roles in
the regulatory framework for aquaculture on Cape Cod.
Because municipalities are authorized to license aquaculture
under G.L. c.130 s.57, the discussion on this statute in the
section on state regulation serves the purpose of
introducing municipal regulation of aquaculture.
B. The Federal Regulatory Framework: Aquaculture Promotion
The federal framework for aquaculture is distinctly
bifurcated. An extensive body of law regulates various
activities related to aquaculture, and a single statute
promotes aquaculture development. This statute, the
National Aquaculture Act of 1980 (NAA) (P.L. 96-362) is
notable in that it does not establish a licensing and
regulatory framework (Wypizinski, 1983, p.5). The NAA
originated in the 94th Congress when House Report 370 was
introduced in the House of Representatives.
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The NAA has three major objectives. First is the
declaration of a national aquaculture policy:
"Congress declares that aquaculture has the
potential for augmenting existing commercial and
recreational fisheries and for producing other
renewable resources, thereby assisting the United
States in meeting its future food needs and
contributing to the solution of world resource
problems. It is, therefore, in the national
interest, and it is the national policy, to
encourage the development of aquaculture in the
United States" (Public Law 96-362) .
The second objective is to develop a national aquaculture
development plan. This was accomplished in 1983 when the
Joint Subcommittee on Aquaculture of the Federal
Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering, and Technology
(JSA) , promulgated the National Aquaculture Development Plan
(House Report 96-660). Volume one describes technologies,
problems, and opportunities associated with aquaculture in
the U.S. and its territories. Volume two identifies primary
species with potential for aquaculture, and includes an
extensive bibliography. Finally, the NAA's objective that
the federal government encourage aquaculture in the private
and public sector is addressed under the JSA's mandate to
identify capital requirements and regulatory constraints.
Adjunct to this task is the responsibility to identify
social constraints to aquaculture development.
The NAA was amended and reauthorized as the National
Aquaculture Improvement Act of 1985 (House Report 99-105).
Amendments included naming the Department of Agriculture as
the lead federal agency for aquaculture, and establishing
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the National Aquaculture Information Center within the
National Agriculture Library. Another amendment
reauthorized and funded five regional aquaculture centers,
to provide a link between the federal government and the
aquaculture industry. The Northeastern Regional Aquaculture
Center serves Massachusetts and twelve other states, and is
located at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth.
As the lead federal agency under NAA 1985, the
Department of Agriculture has established an Office of
Aquaculture (Aquaculture: A Guide to Federal Government
Programs, 1992, p.iii). In addition, its Cooperative State
Research Service and Cooperative Extension Service (CES) ,
have regional offices that include aquaculture promotion as
a part of their mission (Aquaculture: A Guide to Federal
Government Programs, 1992, pp.6, 8). The CES has
established an office on Cape Cod in the Deeds and Probate
building in the town of Barnstable.
The Department of Commerce (DOC) has the primary
responsibility to promote marine aquaculture. The National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is the primary marine
research arm of the DOC (Aquaculture: A Guide to Federal
Government Programs, 1992, p.19). The NMFS disseminates
aquaculture related information and technical advances
gained from its fisheries research programs (Aquaculture: A
Guide to Federal Government Programs, 1992, p.19). In
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addition, NMFS cooperates with governments, NGO's,
universities, and private interests, to promote United
States marine aquaculture products (Aquaculture: A Guide to
Federal Government Programs, 1992, p.19). Further, the NOAA
National Sea Grant College Program conducts research,
extension, and educational programs with universities in all
coastal and Great Lakes states (Aquaculture: A Guide to
Federal Government Programs, 1992, p.19). Finally, NOAA's
Marine Advisory Service provides public education,
technology transfer, and demonstration projects related to
marine aquaculture (Aquaculture: A Guide to Federal
Government Programs, 1992, p.19).
In the Department of the Interior, the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) promotes the development
of marine aquaculture several ways. First, it supports
aquaculture projects that are compatible with the goal of
conserving marine fisheries resources (Aquaculture: A Guide
to Federal Government Programs, 1992, p.25). In addition,
it provides technical assistance to the aquaculture industry
(Aquaculture: A Guide to Federal Government Programs, 1992,
p.25). Finally, it provides information services through
the Office of Extension and Publications (Aquaculture: A
Guide to Federal Government Programs, 1992, p.25).
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c. The Federal Legal Framework: Aquaculture Regulation
Federal regulation of aquaculture is accomplished under
the purview of statutory programs related to the
government's interest in navigation, environmental
protection, and public health. In the case of navigation,
the primary issue regarding aquaculture is the placement of
structures in navigable water. Effluent discharges, and
species and ecosystem damage are the primary environmental
protection issues. The public health issue is related to
the human consumption of aquaculture products. The
following discussion is limited to federal statutes that
relate to aquaculture on Cape Cod.
1. Navigation
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (33
U.S.C.A. Section 401 et seq.) (RHA) requires a permit for
any activity effecting or obstructing navigable waters, and
is administered by the Army Corps of Engineers (COE). In
the case of aquaculture on Cape Cod, section 10 permits are
most pertinent to water column based culture systems.
However, bottom culture systems, although seldom an actual
obstruction to navigation, are subject to RHA by virtue of
their placement in navigable water.
2. Environmental Protection
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(33 U.S.C.A. Sections 1311-1344), commonly known as the
Clean Water Act (CWA), requires a permit for the discharge
39
of dredge or fill materials into navigable water, and is co-
administered by caE and The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). In response to the potential problem of redundancy,
caE has issued a Programmatic General Permit (PGP) to
administer the permit programs of both RHA and CWA in
Massachusetts. The PGP provides a simplified review process
for minimal impact projects that fall within caE permitting
jurisdiction (Snow-Cotter, 1993). Most aquaculture
operations in Massachusetts fall under "Category II Screened
PGP" activities, which are considered to have a relatively
low potential for environmental damage. In addition to caE
and EPA, Category II Projects are reviewed by USFWS and NMFS
(Snow-Cotter, 1993). While PGP's streamline the federal
permit process, they are void if a proposed aquaculture
operation fails to satisfy any other state or local permit
requirements.
The purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (42 U.S.C. Section 4321 et seq.), commonly known as
NEPA, is to determine the comprehensive potential
environmental impact of proposed projects. Environmental
Impact Statements (EIS) are the tool by which NEPA meets
this goal (Kalo, 1990, p.166). As EIS's are lengthy and
time consuming, Environmental Assessments (EA) are typically
substituted for them (Kalo, 1990, p.168). The primary
function of an EA is to provide a basis for evaluating
whether a project requires an EIS.
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The primary tool for regulating the discharge of water
from aquaculture projects is The National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). NPDES is authorized
by Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(33 U.S.C. 1342), which requires a permit for any activity
resulting in the discharge of any pollutant into navigable
waters. Shellfish hatcheries that discharge such effluents
into navigable waters fall under the purview of NPDES (Snow-
Cotter, 1993). There is a single shellfish hatchery on Cape
Cod, located in the town of Dennis, that is under the
purview of NPDES.
3. Public Health
The Food and Drug Administration's National Shellfish
Sanitation Program (NSSP) addresses public health issues
related to pathogens in all commercial harvests of shellfish
(U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1990). The Interstate Shellfish
Sanitation Conference (ISSC) has adopted NSSP standards to
assure the public that shellfish in the marketplace is safe
to eat (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1990). The ISSC, consisting
of all coastal and some inland states, requires member
states to follow NSSP standards for shellfish harvesting,
handling, and marketing (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1990).
Dealers or shippers from states that do not comply with NSSP
standards can be dropped from the FDA's Interstate Shellfish
Shippers List (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1990). Such action
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results in complying states boycotting shellfish from non-
complying states (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1990).
D. The State Regulatory Framework: Aquaculture Promotion
This section reviews the historic development of G.L.
c.130 s.57, the statute under which aquaculture is lawful in
Massachusetts today. The purpose of the following
discussion is to establish the precedent for G.L. c.130
s.57.
The archetype of G.L. c.130 s.57 was established during
colonial times. In 1633 the General Court amended a 1623
PlYmouth Colony Law on Inland Fisheries that had established
the free and common right of fishing, hunting, and fowling:
"But if any man desire to improve a place and
stocke it with fish 1 of any kind for his private
use, it shall bee lawful for the court to make any
such graunt and for bid all others to make use of
it" (A Collection of The Laws of Massachusetts
Relating to Inland Fisheries, 1623-1886, p. 34).
This demonstrates that aquaculture once enjoyed a special
legal status under which it could supersede the public right
in fishing. However, all remnants of this status was lost
in 1848 when G.L. c.151 authorized the state to issue
licenses for oyster culture; under section one it became
unlawful for oyster culture to impair the private or public
rights of any person. In 1860 G.L. c.83 s.12 transferred
the authority of the state to license oyster culture to the
mayor or aldermen of any city, or the selectmen of any town.
Although limited to Mount Hope Bay and its tributaries, the
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first statute to authorize the culture of all shellfish
occurred in 1874, when G.L. c.185 was passed.
Under the Acts and Resolves of 1885 c.220 s.l, public
hearings were established as a condition of oyster culture
licensing. In 1895 G.S. c.282 s.2 defined the geographic
scope of the private rights of riparian proprietors, with
respect to siting oyster culture nursery operations:
"nothing herein contained shall authorize the
placing of such shells2 upon the land of any
riparian owner, between high water and low water
mark, without the written consent of such owner"
(G.S. c.282 s.2, p.288).
Chapter 91 section 105 of the Revised Laws of Massachusetts
of 1902 required that oyster culture proposals include a
written description of the boundaries of the proposed
culture site. Omission of such information made the
proposal void. In 1909 this same requirement was applied to
quahog culture under G.L. c.469 s.6, with the additional
requirement that boundaries be determined by survey. In
addition, section seven provided for the revocation of
quahog culture leases when non-performance could be proven.
Related to this issue, Chapter 597 Section 3 of the Acts of
1914 required that annual production reports be submitted to
the appropriate municipal agent.
In 1921 the promulgation of G.L. c.130 marked the first
step toward the structure of G.L. c.130 s.57; previously
separate oyster and quahog culture statutes were gathered
into a single statute. 3 Despite the redundancy of several
43
provisions in the oyster and quahog statutes, each species
was authorized separately.4 It was not until the Acts of
Massachusetts of 1933 c.329 that the term "shellfish" was
substituted for oyster and quahog. Thus, Massachusetts had
its first comprehensive aquaculture statute. However,
section 57 prohibited the siting of aquaculture operations
where municipal shellfish propagation projects had occurred
in the preceding two years.
In 1973 the scope of aquaculture increased, when G.L.
c.130 was amended. Section 68a was promulgated in response
to the development of water column based shellfish grow-out
systems, commonly referred to as off-bottom culture. Prior
to section 68a, aquaculture in Massachusetts was limited to
bottom culture. In addition to the advantage of increased
productivity per unit area, due to the three dimensional
configuration of off-bottom culture systems, section 68a
allowed aquaculture to avoid social conflict related to
private riparian rights. However, the potential for social
conflict related to public rights in navigation and fishing
increased. This issue was addressed by a provision that
permitted compatible navigation and fishing activities
within the lease area. Finally, in 1994 G.L. c.130 was
amended to create a single licensing authority for bottom
culture and off-bottom culture. Another amendment created a
single section, section 57, which encompasses all the
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previous sections of G.L. c.130. Thus, aquaculture in
Massachusetts today is authorized under G.L. c.130 s.57.
E. The State Regulatory Framework: Aquaculture Regulation
Similar to the federal framework for aquaculture
regulation, Massachusetts regulates aquaculture under
several statutes. The following discussion identifies
statutes and regulatory programs that address issues related
to aquaculture as currently practiced on Cape Cod. The
primary purpose of each of these statutes is environmental
protection.
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) administers programs to protect the state's
waterways under G.L. c.91. Section lOA regulates activities
that include mooring temporary structures. Upon the
recommendation of a harbormaster or person empowered to
fulfill duties pertinent to local water resources,
municipalities are authorized to grant licenses for placing
floats or rafts within their waters, subject to DEP
approval. Structures larger than 2000 square feet, or that
are located outside established harbor lines, must receive
direct approval from DEP.
Section 18 requires applicants to submit descriptions
of the location, dimensions, and activities of a proposed
project. Town planning boards are authorized to conduct
public hearings and submit reports to DEP. In order to
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receive a favorable determination from DEP, a proposal must
show that it serves a proper public purpose, and does not
deleteriously effect public rights in tidal lands. DEP is
also authorized to develop license conditions, and revoke
licenses for noncompliance. Municipalities may request a
public hearing upon a determination by DEP. In addition,
persons aggrieved by a DEP determination are entitled to an
adjudicatory hearing.
Massachusetts regulates aquaculture that occurs in
wetlands under G.L. c.131 s.40, the Massachusetts Wetlands
Protection Act. Potential activities related to aquaculture
that fall under the purview of s.40 include the removal,
fill, dredging, or altering of wetlands. The regulatory
program that fulfills the purpose of G.L. 131 s.40, is found
in 310 CMR s.10.00. At the time of its implementation, 310
CMR s.10.04 "grandfathered" existing aquaculture operations
as exempt from the permitting process, which regulates
maintenance and improvements to aquaculture operations.
Subsequent proposed aquaculture operations are required to
obtain a determination of applicability from the appropriate
local conservation commission. Public hearings are required
under this procedure. A negative determination of
applicability exempts any project from the 310 CMR s.10.00
permit process. Finally, G.L. c.30 ss. 62, 62H, the
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), authorizes
the Secretary of Environmental Affairs to review proposed
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activities to determine their environmental impacts. The
Environmental Impact Report (EIR) is the primary tool for
making such determinations, and requires descriptions of
proposed activities and environmental impacts. EIR's may
subsequently impose conditions necessary to minimize an
operation'S environmental impacts. EIR's are also subject
to a thirty day public review period in order to give
interested parties an opportunity to submit comment.
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CHAPTER THREE
AQUACULTURE ON CAPE COD
A. History of Aquaculture on Cape Cod
A review of the general history of aquaculture
indicates that the problem of social conflict is not unique
to Cape Cod. Tracing the development of aquaculture from
ancient times to the recent past in Massachusetts reveals
the fundamental nature of social conflict, its effect on the
industry, and the legal response to the competing demands of
aquaculture and other interests.
Most records are lost in antiquity but some show that
oysters were raised by the Japanese as early as 2000 B.C.
(Iversen, 1968, p.29), while Sergius Orata is credited with
being the first to culture oysters in ancient Rome. The
Roman historian Pliny discussed Orata's purpose in
establishing oyster culture:
"The first person who formed artificial oyster
beds was Sergius Orata ... as he contrived to make a
large income by this exercise of his ingenuity"
(Watson, 1988, p.32).
Oyster culture was introduced to Britain by the Romans, and
it remained after the demise of the empire. A record from
the Middle Ages (540 A.D.-1450 A.D.) indicates the relative
nature of private rights in aquaculture at this time:
"A man's title was stronger if the oysters could
be reached by wading at low water without having
to use a dredge ... litigation sometimes hinged on
this point. When a man went out of his depth, he
tended to lose both his control over the growth
environment and the full protection of the law-
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although in theory, at least, the state owned the
seabed out to the three mile limit and could lease
any part of it to a private individual or company"
(Watson, 1988, p.33).
During the 17th century in England, improvements were made
in oyster culture methods, including the enclosing of
artificial beds. The importance of these beds is reflected
in legal penalties for damaging them or the oysters upon
them. Despite legal protection, artificial beds located in
deeper waters were especially vulnerable to poaching:
"greedy fishermen in great numbers began dragging
their dredges through them ... this blind
destruction probably contributed to the dramatic
collapse of the large oyster fisheries 1 of both
England and France" (Watson, 1988, p.35).
This destruction and the overharvesting of natural beds, led
Harry Lobb, director of the South of England Oyster Company,
to declare:
"The natural Oyster Beds of the United Kingdom are
nearly exhausted, for, free to all comers, and
from the enormous and increasing demand, the
fishermen have dredged them bare.
Therefore 'Private Breeding Beds are an actual
necessity' there is a demand for 100,000 acres
of Breeding Beds" (Watson, 1988, pp.34-35).
Trigg's guide to Hayling, published about 1890, describes
the farms that Lobb set up:
"The beds are so enclosed that by means of sluices
the water is maintained at any depth according to
season. The quantity of spat preserved in this
manner in 1866 and 1867 was so great that very
sanguine anticipation was formed of the commercial
success of the company ... A large outlay has been
expended and they are now the largest and best
constructed beds in England" (Watson, 1988, p.35).
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The practice of oyster culture accompanied the English
settlers to colonial America. However, so did the practice
of unregulated harvesting of natural oyster beds. In
response to the latter, the General Court of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony passed regulations in 1661 with the
intent to conserve the supply of natural oysters. However,
after 1700 it became apparent that oyster stocks had been
overfished, and were depleted in most coastal towns. By
1800 this problem had become critical; oysters had
disappeared from the Gulf of Maine and areas north of
Boston, and stocks on Cape Cod were in decline (Sweet, 1951,
p. 4) .
To offset this problem, large cargoes of southern
stocks of oysters were shipped north. In some cases,
oysters were shipped in the spring and subsequently bedded
in sheltered waters for use in the early fall. Around 1840
it was noticed that some of these oysters had spawned, and
produced quantities of juvenile oysters, or "spat." This
led to the experimental planting of clean oyster shells to
catch oyster' spat in South Norwalk, Connecticut. The
success of such experiments led to the passage of laws in
1855 to encourage private oyster culture in Connecticut and
New York (Sweet, 1951, p.5).
These laws were resented by traditional oystermen, and
in deference to such deep-seated feelings, early statutes
provided that private oyster grants could not be issued
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where natural oyster beds occurred. In addition, private
oyster grants were limited to two acres in size. However,
this provision proved ineffective as individual grant
holders conveyed their grants to a single grower. The
success of this new industry and the failure of small scale
operations, resulted in public acceptance of large scale
private oyster culture (Sweet, 1951, p.5).
During the establishment of oyster culture in this
region, oyster seed was acquired from natural beds and
transferred to private grant2 areas and allowed to grow to
market size. However, the supply of natural oyster seed was
soon exhausted, and new methods of capturing larval oysters
were developed.
Oyster culture on Cape Cod evolved from the practice
of bedding oysters, as described above. In the early 1700's
oysters harvested from local waters were bedded in Wellfleet
and Buzzards Bay during springtime, and shipped to Boston
for transplant in the fall. The purpose of this was to take
advantage of exceptional conditions on Cape Cod that
produced rapid growth and superior flavor (Kochiss, 1974,
p. 39) .
However, Wellfeet's oyster beds were rapidly depleted
by overfishing and the harvest of shells for lime
production. The latter practice impacted the natural
production of oysters as it depleted the supply of cultch
needed for the setting of larval oysters. In response,
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Wellfleet's beds were stocked with oysters from other
states; by the 1840's oysters were acquired from the
Chesapeake Bay. This allowed the practice of bedding to
continue in Wellfleet until about 1870 (Belding, 1909,
p.126) .
After the Civil War, the leading oyster bedding region
in Massachusetts was centered around Boston, which reduced
the demand for Wellfleet oysters. Nonetheless, the bedding
industry around Boston declined as the supply of oysters
gradually decreased. As a consequence, the growing of
native oysters was substituted for oyster bedding. Swansee
was the first town to permit the selling of private oyster
privileges in 1869. The first attempt at actual oyster
culture occurred in 1881 when E.W. Cook acquired native
oyster seed from Somerset, and planted it in Wellfleet
Harbor. Cook's experiment succeeded and was emulated by
others, who in turn became prominent oyster growers. By
1900 Wellfleet had re-emerged as a producer of high quality
oysters (Kochiss, 1974, p.42-43).
As a result of this success, an extensive grant system
developed on Cape Cod. The emergence of Cape Cod as the
undisputed center of aquaculture in Massachusetts by the end
of the 19th century is evident in the following comment:
"The last census shows that Barnstable county has
562.5 acres of oyster beds, which is more than
two-thirds of all the grounds in the state (Deyo,
p. 791, 1890).
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However, aquaculture did not become established on Cape Cod
on a regional basis. This lack of uniformity was perceived
to result from the different political response of
individual towns, and to the hostility toward aquaculture by
traditional oystermen, quahaugers, and private riparian
proprietors. As aquaculture required at least a degree of
private control over portions of water resources, these
interest groups tended to perceive it as an evil monopoly
(Kochiss, 1974, pp. 43-44). In contrast, the Massachusetts
Commissioners on Fisheries and Game perceived the system of
local control as a detriment to the state's legitimate
interest in conserving shellfish resources:
"The present laws have placed the mollusk
fisheries completely in the hands of the
Philistines of town government. Petty local
jealousies, unsystematic tenure and uncertainty as
to private and public rights have prevented the
development of private enterprise. By the system
of town control we have escaped neither the
dangers of monopoly nor of continued depletion of
the supply, while the facts concerning the public
ownership of the shellfisheries are in danger of
becoming obscured" (Commissioners on Fisheries and
Game, "Preliminary Report Upon The Shellfisheries
of Massachusetts," 1906, p.4).
In response to these problems, the following solutions were
proposed: 1) eliminate the public right to take shellfish
from privately cultured tideflats; 2) restore complete
control over shellfisheries to the state; 3) clarify and
enforce the law that riparian proprietors do not possess
exclusive rights in the shellfish on their tideflats; 4)
convert traditional fishermen to aquaculture (Belding, 1909,
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pp.9-12). None of these recommendations ever took effect,
and town control of aquaculture continues today.
B. Current Aquaculture on Cape Cod
The current aquaculture industry on Cape Cod is
characterized by small scale operations consisting of one to
two acre lease sites located on tideflats (Moles, 1996). The
current industry is distinguished from the industry during
the 1800's; oysters were replaced by quahaugs as the top
species produced during the period 1980-1983 (Huff (ed.),
1985, p.11). In addition, advances in hatchery techniques,
pioneered by Dr. Victor Loosanoff at the NMFS Milford
laboratory in 1954, have resulted in a reliable supply of
relatively low cost shellfish seed (Iversen, 1968, p.37).
While this innovation has made it possible for the current
cottage industry to emerge, it is unevenly distributed
throughout Cape Cod. After promising signs of growth
beginning in the 1970's, aquaculture was faced with some of
the same problems that beset the industry at the turn of the
century. This is reflected in a 1986 conference report,
"Strategies for Aquaculture Development in Massachusetts":
"This is an exciting time for anyone interested in
the future of aquaculture in Massachusetts. The
promise, perhaps, has never been brighter, nor the
potential opportunities greater. Yet some major
obstacles, including water quality problems,
regulatory impediments, public attitudes, and
insufficient knowledge stand in the way of
achieving the promise and realizing the
opportunities" (Parker (ed.), 1986, p.vi).
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Speaking at the same conference, James Fair, Assistant
Director of the Commercial Fisheries Division of the
Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries, characterized
the industry in the state at that time:
"In 1969 we had 39 grants in 8 towns, which
totaled about 150 acres. Since that time there
has been a great interest in the field. A lot of
interest in training on the part of universities
and so forth has created a whole new class of
people who are interested in aquaculture as a
substitute for simply fishing in the wild
fisheries. So today we find ourselves with 101
grants which are located in 19 towns and take up
about 536 acres. In addition to that, there are
pending another 23 grants with over 100 acres"
(Parker (ed.), 1986, p.158).
A 1984 study conducted by the Center for Policy Analysis at
the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, found that
Cape Cod encompassed 62 percent of the aquaculture leases
and 59 percent of the acreage under cultivation in the state
(Huff (ed.), 1985). The following tables were derived from
this study. A comparison of tables one and two reflects a
characteristic of the current situation on Cape Cod; both
large and small aquaculture operations occur on Cape Cod.
Table 3 represents aquaculture production in bushels for the
years 1980 and 1983.
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TABLE 1.
AQUACULTURE LEASES ON CAPE COD (1984)
















LARGEST AQUACULTURE LEASES ON CAPE COD (1984)
Lessee Species Town Acres
Cotuit Oyster Oyster Barnstable 53
Cape Cod Oyster Oyster Barnstable 25
Olin Kelly Oyster/Quahog Falmouth 22
Francis Sullivan Quahog Mashpee 20
Seaquester Farms Oyster Barnstable 13




AQUACULTURE PRODUCTION IN BUSHELS (1980 and 1983)
Species 1980 1983
Quahogs 564 9,826







While the preceding tables represent the number of
leases and production levels, it is believed that production
figures are inaccurate (Huff (ed.) ,1985, p.10). There is an
incentive to under-report annual production; there are no
administrative procedures to verify the accuracy of annual
production reports. The benefit of under-reporting is tax
avoidance. While the dollar value of total aquaculture is
reported at $733,996, it was subsequently estimated that the
actual dollar value was $7,000,000 (Huff (ed.), 1985, p.10).
This would put aquaculture production at 29% of the total
shellfish production in Massachusetts in 1983.
The remainder of this chapter describes the current
aquaculture industry on Cape Cod. The following table
represents the most recent data available at the time of
this writing. The total number of aquaculture leases on
Cape Cod in 1994 was 121, which occupied a total of 364
acres. The primary species cultured are the quahog
(Mercenaria mercenaria) and the common oyster (Crassostrea
virginica). Others include the bay scallop (Aequipectin
irradians), soft shell clam (Mya arenaria), European oyster
(Ostrea edulis), surf clam (Spisula solidissima) and the
blue mussel (Mytilus edulis) (Moles, 1996).
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TABLE 4.
AQUACULTURE LEASES ON CAPE COD (1992-1994)
Town Number of Leases I Total Acres Growth
1992 1993 1994
Barnstable 2 / 78 4 / 68 5 / 72 +3
Bourne 1 / 1 1 / 1 0 / 0 -1
Brewster 1 / 0.5 1 / 0.5 6 / 7 +5
Chatham 1 / 4 1 / 4 1 / 4 0
Dennis 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0
Eastham 7 / 6 8 / 9 11 / 8 +4
Falmouth 1 / 22 1 / 22 1 / 22 0
Harwich 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0
Mashpee 3 / 16 3 / 16 3 / 16 0
Orleans 10 / 11 13 / 12 17 / 20 +7
Provincetown 26 / 35 30 / 38 30 / 29 +4
Sandwich 0 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0 0
Truro 1 / 2 1 / 1 1 / 10 0
Wellfleet 42 /116 43 /148 43 /149 +1
Yarmouth 3 / 25 3 / 25 3 / 25 0
Totals 98 /316.5 109 /344.5 111 /362 +13
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Data related to the number of aquaculture leases per
town is not available for the duration of the study period
(Moles, 1996). Aquaculture production data is also lacking
for each year of the study period (Moles, 1996). However,
it was indicated that a comparison of 1984 data (Table One)
with 1992 data (Table Four) is representative of industry
growth pattern during that time span (Moles, 1996). In nine
towns, no change in the number of aquaculture leases
occurred, three towns showed a decrease of one lease during
that time, and one town showed a decrease of five leases.
Only three towns showed positive growth between 1984 and
1992, Orleans (+5), Provincetown (+24), and Wellfleet (+24).
In some cases, negative growth was related to leases that
were not renewed by the lessee (Moles, 1996).
First time operators typically purchase about 50,000
seed which are planted in the months of September or October
(Olsen, 1996). Established operations sometimes purchase
more than 1 million seed at a time. Seed ranges in size
from 1 rom to 12 rom (measured along the longest axis), with
3-4 rom the most popular size (Olsen, 1996}.3 In the case of
seed up to 4 rom, a field nursery is utilized to raise it to
a larger size (about 10 rom) for subsequent field planting. 4
The advantages of this approach is that the purchase price
is lower, and field planting at a larger size tends to
minimize mortality.
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Nursery systems consist of a series of trays that are
located on tideflats and held in place by means of attached
supports that are driven into the substratum (Olsen, 1996).
This allows the tray to be raised off the bottom, which
facilitates better water circulation, and minimizes the
deposition of sediment. Their location on tideflats allows
ease of access at low tide when they are exposed. Access to
the trays is essential for predator control; swimming crab
larvae and other predators can enter the tray, metamorphose,
and consume a significant portion of the seed. Up to 10,000
seed quahaugs may be planted in a single nursery tray
(Massachusetts Aquaculture White Paper, 1995).
Vinyl coated wire mesh (1-1.5 in. sq.), the same
material used for lobster traps, is used to construct the
nursery trays. The trays are constructed by each
aquaculturist according to personal preference. There is no
standard tray design, however, dimensions typically range
from 18" x 18" x 5", to 5' X la' x 6" (Olsen, 1996). The
trays are filled to a depth of about 1-1.5 inches, with a
clean sand-gravel mixture which is acquired from inland
sources in order to ensure that it is free of predators
(Olsen,1996). In some cases, substratum from the grow out
site is utilized, and it is sifted to remove predators.
Another purpose of substratum in nursery trays is to
provide a means for stabilizing the seed. Experiments with
trays lacking substratum have demonstrated that seed will
62
crowd as a function of water circulation. This tends to
bury much of the seed, which can decrease growth rate or
result in mortality. In the case of quahaugs the seed is
very active and will crawl extensively within trays. This
energy expenditure may have a negative effect on growth
rate. Some aquaculturists forgo nursery operations, and
purchase larger seed that is suitable for field planting
(Olsen, 1996). One aquaculturist indicated that the
additional cost of the larger seed is offset by the time and
effort saved by direct planting. In addition, the absence
of nursery trays on the lease site may reduce opposition
(Benjamin, 1995). Other advantages include a shorter grow
out period and a lower mortality rate.
In the case of quahaugs, the substratum of the field
grow out site should be a sand-mud composition; it should be
sufficiently soft to accommodate burrowing by the seed, and
sufficiently firm to accommodate walking by the
aquaculturist (Benjamin, 1996). First time operations may
require clearing of debris from the grow out site. This is
accomplished by raking the surface, which also removes
crabs, whelks, and other predators. Depending upon the seed
size at field planting, it may take three years before
market size is attained. 5 In such cases, the grow out site
may be subdivided into four sections to ensure that a
planting site is always available after the first planting
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year crop is harvested (Benjamin, 1996). This potentially
ensures an annual harvest.
Planting is accomplished by scattering the seed by hand
at low tide. Care is taken to ensure an even distribution
of seed onto the grow out site. After planting, protective
mesh netting (1.5 mm diagonal mesh size) is stretched over
the grow out site, and stapled to the substratum by various
devices (Benjamin, 1996). A common device for this purpose
is iron re-bar, which is bent into a "U" shape. The netting
is held down flush with the substratum. Maintenance is
simple. The aquaculturist may check the grow out site for
predators and debris at low tide. Predator control usually
consists of killing or removing any predators present.
Access to the grow out site is facilitated either by motor
vehicle or by small motorized boat (Benjamin, 1996).
Harvesting is accomplished by hand, utilizing a large
bullrake or a small seven tine hand rake. Bullrakes are
used to harvest at high tide. They consist of a curved
steel basket-like rake that is attached to a long "T"
handled pole. The bullrake may be utilized from a small
skiff or by an individual wading in the shallow water. Hand
rakes are used to harvest at low tide, and the shellfish are
placed into containers for storage and retrieval
(Benjamin,1996). In the case of quahaugs, harvesting at the
minimum legal size has two advantages; "littlenecks" command
the highest price, and require the least grow out period.
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This, and good growth rates are the predominant reasons that
quahaugs have become the primary shellfish species cultured
on Cape Cod (Benjamin, 1996).
While this discussion essentially describes quahog
culture, there are two distinctions in the case of
oysters: 61) oysters require a relatively harder substratum
than quahaugs as they do not burrow, and are vulnerable to
burial on softer, shifting substrates; 2) some oyster
aquaculture operations still acquire seed via spat
collection (Olsen, 1996). In the majority of cases, the
original method of broadcasting clean shells onto the grant
surface is utilized. A recent innovation is the use of
perforated plastic disks. They are coated with a fine layer
of cement and stacked onto posts, which are driven into the
substratum. After the larval oysters have set, they are





This chapter presents the research methods and findings
of this study. In order to test the contention that the
potential for social conflict to constrain aquaculture on
Cape Cod is relatively high, the following tasks were
carried out: 1) identify sources of social conflict that
have been shown to constrain aquaculture; 2) formulate
indicators related to these sources; 3) utilize the
indicators to test the stated contention.
The first task was accomplished by searching each
towns' records related to aquaculture, and in one case, by
the attendance of the principal researcher at a public
hearing related to a proposed aquaculture venture. The
required information was located among the following
offices: 1) Board of Selectmen; 2) shellfish constable; 3)
harbormaster; 4) Department of Natural Resources. Sources
of social conflict were related to private riparian
property, the public right in shellfishing, and multiple use
conflict.
In towns where cases of social conflict were
identified, town officials familiar with each case were
interviewed. This was done to determine whether factors
other than social conflict were responsible for the outcome
of the case. In all cases, social conflict was confirmed as
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the primary issue upon which the outcome of each case was
determined. This validated the use of indicators as tools
for determining the potential of social conflict to
constrain aquaculture.
In addition, town officials with a regulatory or
advisory role related to aquaculture were interviewed in
each town to determine if social conflict had influenced
aquaculture policies. For the purpose of this study, the
potential of social conflict to constrain aquaculture has
two attributes. The first is direct, and occurs when a
proposed aquaculture venture is denied or withdrawn as a
result of social conflict. The second is indirect, and
occurs when a town policy responds to the potential for
social conflict, and limits the growth of aquaculture with
respect to potential social conflict. For the purpose of
this study, both attributes are considered in conclusions
regarding the potential of social conflict to constrain
aquaculture.
Based upon the findings in town records, indicators
were formulated for the following sources of social
conflict: 1) private riparian property; 2) shellfishing. The
respective indicators are: 1) the percent of linear mileage
of private versus public coastline; 2) the ratio of the
number of shellfish permits per acre of estuarine tideflats.
In addition, multiple use conflict was the apparent
source of social conflict in two cases. However, indicators
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for multiple use conflict were not formulated. Much of the
information was not available that could potentially have
been used to formulate appropriate indicators. For
instance, data relevant to navigational interests was not
available. However, as multiple use conflict was identified
as a source of social conflict, it remains a valid area of
further research.
B. Examples of Social Conflict
1. Case One: Shellfishing; Chatham, 1983
A conflict developed when a bottom culture venture to
raise blue mussels was proposed on the "common flats",
located in the vicinity of Monomoy Island. Ten letters of
opposition addressed to the Board of Selectmen were found in
the shellfish constable's files. However, as three were
from the same person and essentially identical, the number
of letters is considered to be eight.
One was from a private riparian proprietor, who
objected to the potential for increased large truck traffic,
and noise and disturbance in the vicinity of his property
(Letter to Chatham Board of Selectmen, December 19, 1983).
One letter opposed the potential for conflict with the
existing horseshoe crab fishery (Letter to Chatham Board of
Selectmen, December 27, 1983). Two letters addressed the
issue of large truck traffic, however it was unclear if the
correspondents were private riparian proprietors (Letters to
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Chatham Board of Selectmen, December 13, 1983; December 30,
1983). Two letters objected to the leasing of, although
unproductive at that time, historically productive
she11fishing grounds (Letters to the Chatham Board of
Selectmen, January 1, 1984; January 10, 1984). One letter
objected to the potential loss of recreational she11fishing
grounds (Letter to the Chatham Board of Selectmen, January,
10, 1984).
In addition, a petition with 313 signatures was found
in the shellfish constable's files. The petition objected
to the leasing of potentially productive shellfish grounds
(Petition to the Chatham Board of Selectmen, January 11,
1984) .
A Chatham Shellfish Advisory Committee memo opposed the
loss of potentially productive shellfish ground to
aquaculture leases. The committee contended that currently
unproductive areas would become productive due to the 1978
breakthrough of the Atlantic Ocean at Inward Point. The
committee subsequently voted to recommend that the Board of
Selectmen deny the proposed aquaculture lease (Chatham
Shellfish Advisory Committee Memo, December 7, 1983).
However, before the Board of Selectmen were able to
vote on the matter, the applicant withdrew his application.
He based his decision on the existing opposition of
she11fishers:
"As events progressed toward the grant,
shellfishermen typically against grants began a
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movement supporting theories and suppositions in
opposition to my grant, and grants in general,
culminating in a call for a moratorium on grants.
The closing of Oyster Pond and threats of
pollution in other areas of town prompted further
fear among shellfishermen that they were losing
productive ground and could not afford to lose any
unproductive ground ... In light of these present
sentiments and emotions concerning this, and other
grants, I feel it may be untimely to have a
decision rendered on my application. It is, then,
with extreme regret and remorse at this time that
I am respectfully requesting the Selectmen to
withdraw my application for a Shellfish Grant off
Monomoy Island" (Letter of John Richards to the
Chatham Board of Selectmen, January 11, 1984).
The comment "shellfishermen typically against grants" tends
to suggest a perception that shellfishers have a
predetermined attitude with respect to aquaculture. In
addition, it is clear that pressure from shellfishers is
capable of constraining aquaculture.
Regarding shellfishers' attitudes, a recent event on
Cape Cod tends to support Richards' perception. An
aquaculturist recently established a lease site on the
tideflats of a private riparian proprietor under the terms
of a legal contract (Hemilla, 1996). Despite the small size
of the lease site, its location on private property, and the
consent of the private riparian proprietor, it was opposed
by shellfishers; prior to the aquaculture venture's
inception, it was threatened that the aquaculturist's house
would be burned if the venture was pursued (Hemilla, 1996).
After the aquaculture venture was established, the
aquaculturist's car windshield was smashed (Hemilla, 1996).
A tendency among some shellfishers toward such acts are
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perhaps universal; experiments on oyster culture in Spain
during the 1950's were met with intense opposition from
traditional oyster fishers, who destroyed every experiment
located on natural oyster beds (Watson, 1988, pp. 41-42).
While current Massachusetts law prohibits aquaculture
in productive shellfish areas, it appears that some
shellfishers' attitudes against aquaculture remain strident.
Although threats of house burning are substituted for the
destruction of aquaculture ventures as a method of
intimidation, it is apparent that some shellfishers are
opposed to aquaculture on Cape Cod today.
2. Case Two: Private Riparian Property; Truro, 1994
A conflict developed at a 1994 public hearing which was
held in regard to a private riparian proprietor's proposed
bottom culture venture to raise sea clams on tideflats in
Cape Cod bay, adjacent to his upland property. Opposition
emerged from a group of seasonal residents, whose private
riparian property was in the vicinity of the proposed
venture. The opposition was led by the applicant's adjacent
neighbor. A primary concern of the opponents was the effect
that a commercial venture would have on the character of the
residential neighborhood (Lessin, 1994). The applicant
attempted to address this concern by stating his agreement
with a town stipulation that all operations be located at
least 600 feet from the mean high water line (Snider, 1996).
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This proved to be inconsequential with respect to the
opponent's interest in aesthetics.
The Board of Selectmen gave preliminary approval to the
proposal, with final approval pending a DMF survey to
determine the productivity of the proposed site. The DMF
determined that the site was unproductive of shellfish and
prepared to issue a permit to allow the proposed venture.
However, the opponent's attorney contacted DMF and
threatened litigation should the permit be issued (Snider,
1996). As a consequence, DMF refused to issue the permit,
which resulted in a de facto denial of the proposed venture
(Snider, 1996).
The perception of the applicant was that the dispute
was based upon differing interests related to social class
structure; seasonal residents may value the coast primarily
for aesthetic reasons, while some year round residents may
also value it for its potential to generate income (Snider,
1996). This tends to suggest that this case reflect Chew's
finding that the magnitude of public concern over aesthetic
impacts of aquaculture is related to the sociopolitical
climate of a community (Chew, 1993).
Class differences have been considered as factors in
potential town planning of aquaculture development in Truro.
The results of a 1993 survey by the Truro planning
department, indicated relatively high public support of
aquaculture as an option for economic development. However,
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it was acknowledged that the potential value of aquaculture
must be balanced against the value of taxes derived from
seasonal residents, many of whom are private riparian
proprietors (Brown, 1993). Such consideration is based upon
the perception that the potential for social conflict in
Truro may be relatively high (Brown, 1993).
c. Interviews of Town Officials
1. Barnstable
In general, the town of Barnstable supports aquaculture
development, as evidenced by an approximately 90% approval
rate of recent lease proposals (Marcotti, 1996). The
Barnstable Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has
produced a GIS map of Barnstable Harbor, as a tool for
identifying areas with biological potential for aquaculture
(Marcotti, 1994). The Department of Natural Resources
considers the biological potential for aquaculture to be
high in Barnstable Harbor, due in part to the presence of
extensive tideflats (Marcotti, 1996).
At the time of this writing, twenty new applications
for shellfish grants in Barnstable Harbor had been received.
However, social conflict from other shellfishing interests
is not unexpected; the lack of standards for determining the
productivity of potential aquaculture sites remains an issue
of concern (Marcotti, 1996). In addition, embaYments such
as North Bay and Cotuit Bay are used heavily by navigational
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and recreational interests, and are considered off limits to
aquaculture (Marcotti, 1996).
2. Bourne
Bourne is in the process of creating an aquaculture
development plan (Merritt, 1996). However, a recent
proposal to designate seven acres in Buttermilk Bay for
aquaculture has generated significant public opposition
(Merritt, 1996). The emergence of opposition at the
suggestion of aquaculture, is attributed to a basic lack of
knowledge regarding aquaculture on the part of the public
(Merritt, 1996). The current lack of an aquaculture
development plan contributes to this problem. In addition,
Bourne has a recent history of social conflict related to
aquaculture; a 20 acre plus off bottom culture scallop
venture was denied in 1988.
The town has a policy of siting future aquaculture
ventures in areas where they will not conflict with existing
uses (Merritt, 1996); the potential for social conflict has
influenced Bourne's aquaculture policy. Finally, the town
shellfish constable considers Bourne to have good biological
potential for aquaculture, and is willing to consider
appropriate bottom culture and off bottom culture ventures
(Merritt, 1996).
3. Brewster
At the time of this writing, Brewster did not have an
aquaculture development plan, but the Department of Natural
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Resources has a positive opinion of aquaculture (Mant,
1995). The Natural Resources officer has an extensive
background in aquaculture, including experience in
production systems, and policy work (Brewster Department of
Natural Resources Memo, 1993).
The recent designation of a portion of tideflats in
Cape Cod bay for aquaculture resulted in approximately 40 to
50 inquiries for aquaculture leases. The town is continuing
to try to identify locations appropriate for aquaculture.
However, aquaculture will not be allowed on town owned
tideflats as they are reserved for the town shellfish
propagation program, which supports the town's interest in
shellfishing (Mant, 1996).
4. Chatham
Chatham implemented a moratorium on accepting
applications for aquaculture in 1985. The town Shellfish
Constable indicated that this is in response to competition
for inshore waters from shellfishing (Moore, 1996).
Compared to shellfishing, Chatham considers aquaculture a
relatively low priority (Moore, 1996). Exacerbating the
problem of competition for inshore waters is the
breakthrough of the Atlantic Ocean at Nauset Spit in 1992.
Extensive redistribution of sediment has altered the
characteristics of some shellfish growing areas in Pleasant
Bay. Because of this, the town has maintained a "wait and
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see" attitude regarding the allocation of potential
shellfish growing areas for aquaculture.
Nonetheless, Chatham did approve a recent proposal to
locate a bottom culture grant offshore in 20 feet of water
(Moore, 1996). This indicates the town's willingness to
consider aquaculture, however, the town remains committed to
reserving inshore waters for shellfishing (Moore, 1996).
5. Dennis
The town of Dennis supports aquaculture, but compared
to shellfishing and recreation it is a relatively low
priority Marcy, 1996). The fact that natural shellfish
populations are increasing further diminishes the
significance of aquaculture (Marcy, 1996). In addition,
most of the estuarine tideflats in Dennis are located near
private riparian property (Marcy, 1996). The town is
willing to consider siting aquaculture on marine tideflats
in Cape Cod bay (Marcy, 1996).
6. Eastham
A small aquaculture industry has existed during the
study period, with grants typically less than one acre
square in size (Lind, 1995). Despite this evidence that
Eastham supports aquaculture, several variables tend to
diminish its present growth potential. A de facto
moratorium on new shellfish grants has been in effect since
1993, due to unresolved problems related to riparian rights
(Lind, 1996). In addition, a good natural set of soft
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shellfish clams in Nauset Harbor, an area historically used
for aquaculture, precludes aquaculture in that area (Lind,
1996) .
Conflicts related to both riparian property and
shellfishing interests occur in Town Cove, an approximately
500 acre embaYment that has been historically used for
aquaculture (Lind, 1996). Tidal creeks that could
potentially be used for aquaculture present physical
constraints; high water current velocities during outgoing
tides virtually preclude aquaculture in these areas (Lind,
1996). Potential conflicts with navigational interests also
contribute to the problem of aquaculture development in
Eastham (Lind, 1996). Nonetheless, the town regards
aquaculture as a positive activity and generally supports it
(Lind, 1996).
7. Falmouth
Although the town of Falmouth has high ecological
potential for aquaculture, shellfishing and navigation
interests are considered higher priorities than aquaculture
(Souza, 1996). The protected embaYments located along
Buzzards Bay and Vineyard Sound contain areas that are
reserved for recreational shellfish permit holders (Souza,
1996). In addition, navigation interests, including ferry
services, tend to predominate along significant portions of
these embaYments. However, the town recently hired a
shellfish constable who is familiar with the problems facing
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aquaculture in Falmouth, and he has a history of supporting
aquaculture where appropriate (Souza, 1996).
8. Harwich
Because Harwich lacks tideflats, inshore aquaculture is
limited to off bottom culture systems. However, Harwich has
not had any aquaculture leases since the 1950's during the
study period (Leach, 1996). The town harbormaster has
indicated that he would encourage aquaculture that avoids
conflicts with navigational interests (Leach, 1995). This
is evident in the town's recent decision to approve an
offshore bottom culture lease, located in 20 feet of water
in Nantucket Sound (Leach, 1996).
However, even offshore sites must address local
navigational interests; seasonal yacht club races have been
historically held in certain areas (Leach, 1996). At the
time of this writing, it was unclear if this lease had been
planted (Leach, 1996). Because this represents a new
culture method on Cape Cod, its potential as a viable means
to encourage aquaculture development is unknown.
9. Mashpee
Due to a significant lack of alternate economic
opportunities, the town of Mashpee is currently targeting
aquaculture as a priority for development (York, 1996).
However, the potential for multiple use conflicts is
regarded as a significant constraint to aquaculture in
inshore waters. Nonetheless, existing grant holders have
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developed a reputation for cooperation that is responsible
for the town's supportive attitude regarding aquaculture
development (York, 1995).
Because the town is intent upon exploring the economic
potential of aquaculture in Mashpee, the approximately
10,000 acres of offshore waters in Nantucket Sound are being
considered for aquaculture development (York, 1996).
However, the effect of current commercial fishing activities
in Nantucket Sound on aquaculture is unknown (York, 1996).
The town shellfish constable is currently working with
commercial fishing groups to develop a plan to accommodate
both aquaculture and existing fisheries in this area (York,
1996).
10. Orleans
A Comprehensive Shellfish Management Plan was written
in 1986 to encourage aquaculture development:
"Orleans has tremendous areas that are presently
unproductive or marginally productive. Therefore,
some of these areas should be set aside for
shellfish farms" (MacFarlane, 1986, pp.25-26).
At present, Orleans has a proactive attitude toward
aquaculture (Jamieson, 1996). Significant demand for
aquaculture has led the town to designate 10 acres in Cape
Cod Bay for aquaculture development (Jamieson, 1996). Based
upon a town regulation to limit the maximum size of
aquaculture leases to two acres, this area can accommodate
five leases. At the time of this writing, no lease
applications had been submitted for this area.
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However, Pleasant Bay presently contains 26 grants,
with the potential to occupy 52 acres (Jamieson, 1996).
Consideration is given to other shellfishing interests in
Pleasant Bay; in the event that a grant is vacated, those
located on tideflats revert to public use, while grants
located subtidally are available to subsequent applicants
(Jamieson, 1996). A waiting list has been established to
accommodate applicants for such sites, with four individuals
currently on the list. In addition, because Town Cove has
shown a significant increase in the amount of shellfish, the
two existing grants at this location have been
"grandfathered", while new grant proposals are not
considered (Jamieson, 1996).
To further secure the viability of aquaculture in
Orleans, a moratorium on grant applications is in effect
until the town completes its Resource Management Plan
(Jamieson, 1996). A goal of this action is to minimize
social conflict. Also, because the Cape Cod National
Seashore encompasses Pleasant Bay, the Town acquired
confirmation from the u.S. National Park Service, that
aquaculture is an approved activity within the boundaries of
the National Seashore (Jamieson, 1996).
11. Provincetown
Provincetown has implemented an aquaculture development
policy that is predicated upon preempting social conflict.
In response to the interests of private riparian
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proprietors, Provincetown allocated a portion of tideflats
for aquaculture development in the West End of town, which
lacks abutting private riparian property (Benjamin, 1995).
Current town policy is to limit all aquaculture ventures to
this area (Benjamin, 1995). In effect, Provincetown has
zoned a portion of its resources for aquaculture
development.
In addition, these areas are sub-divided into plots.
Aquaculture proposals will be considered until the final
plot is filled, at which time a de facto moratorium on
further development will be in effect (Benjamin, 1995).
However, if demand for aquaculture development remains high,
the town is willing to consider similar zoning in other
areas (Benjamin, 1995).
12. Sandwich
Sandwich has not had an aquaculture industry during the
study period. In addition, there is no apparent demand for
aquaculture development. While Sandwich is willing to
consider aquaculture, there is no present effort by the town
to initiate development of the industry (Galkowski, 1994).
13. Truro
At present, Truro's policy is to support aquaculture.
This is evident in a recent decision by the Board of
Selectmen to give preliminary approval to a proposed sea
clam culture operation, despite the threat of litigation
from adjacent private riparian proprietors (Halway, 1996).
81
However, the magnitude of public opposition in this dispute
indicates a high probability for potential social conflict
in Truro. An interesting possibility exists for aquaculture
in Truro; an experimental sea scallop cage culture operation
was recently approved as it is located in subtidal water
(Halway, 1996).
14. Wellfleet
Wellfleet is the historic and current center of
aquaculture on Cape Cod. However, recent social conflict
related to private riparian property has had a significant
impact on aquaculture. The town has responded by planning
aquaculture development in areas that are as free as
possible of social conflict. The town's recent plan to site
aquaculture leases near Egg Island was based partly on the
fact that the area is removed from private riparian
property. (Somerville, 1996). Similarly, despite the area's
ecological suitability for aquaculture, it is unlikely that
Black Fish Creek will be considered for siting aquaculture
in the near future, due partly to the presence of private
riparian property (Somerville, 1996).
Subsequent to the SJC decision in the Pazzolt case,
Wellfleet instituted a moratorium on accepting new
aquaculture lease proposals in 1993 (Somerville, 1996).
However, prior to that time, the town instituted a waiting
list in 1986 to accommodate applicants (Somerville, 1996).
The town stopped accepting waiting list applications in
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1992, due to the number of applications pending (Somerville,
1996). The most recent grants were approved in 1989
(Somerville, 1996).
15. Yar.mouth
Yarmouth is supportive of aquaculture. The town is
cautiously examining the possibility of designating 12 acres
in Cape Cod Bay for bottom culture of sea clams grants
(Montague, 1995). A potential constraint to aquaculture in
this area is the occasional presence of block ice during the
winter months (Montague, 1995). The town shellfish
constable indicated that an additional 5 acres in
Yarmouthport may be suitable for aquaculture (Montague,
1995). Finally, the town is willing to consider proposals
for grants in the waters of Nantucket Sound (Montague,
1995). A constraint to utilizing this area is the current
closed status of shellfishing waters. However, it is
anticipated that they are likely to be re-classified as open
(Montague, 1995). Despite these possibilities, Yarmouth
considers aquaculture a low priority relative to existing
shellfish and navigation interests.
D. Proposed Standard Indicators of the Potential for Social
Conflict
This section introduces two proposed standard
indicators (PSIs) of social conflict, one related to private
riparian property, the other to shellfishing. The PSI of
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the potential for social conflict related to private
riparian property is the percent of linear mileage of
private versus public coastline in the town of Truro during
1994. Information regarding the mileage of coastline for
each town on Cape Cod was derived from "The Extremes of Cape
Cod Including a Geological Abstract", a 1996 report produced
by the Cape Cod Commission. The PSI of the potential for
social conflict related to shellfishing, is the ratio of the
number of shellfish permits per acre of estuarine tideflats
in Chatham during 1984. As such, the values of the standard
indicators are directly related to cases in which proposed
aquaculture ventures were denied or withdrawn in response to
social conflict.
The purpose of the PSIs is to provide guidelines for
analyzing the current potential for social conflict with
respect to both private riparian property and shellfishing
in each town on Cape Cod. The current potential for social
conflict is partly analyzed by comparing PSI values with
current indicator values. Current indicators of the
potential for social conflict represent 1994 conditions, and
are based upon the same variables that were used to
formulate standard indicators of the potential for social
conflict.
1. Private Riparian Property
The PSI value of the potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property was derived from Case
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Two: Private Riparian Property; Truro, 1994. The PSI value
is: 21 linear miles of private coastline/24 linear miles of
total coastline = 0.88. This value represents an estimate of
the prevalence of private coastline associated with a case
in which private riparian property was the source of social
conflict that led to the denial of a proposed aquaculture
venture.
As Case Two showed, the magnitude of public opposition
was an important factor in the withdrawal of the proposed
aquaculture venture. This opposition was related to the
prevalence of private riparian property, which characterized
the coastline in the vicinity of the proposed aquaculture
venture. It is assumed that other towns on Cape Cod with a
similar prevalence, or percent, of private coastline may
have a similar potential for social conflict related to
private riparian property. Therefor, current indicator
values that are equal to or greater than 0.88 are considered
to represent a relatively high potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property.
In addition, the distribution of private versus public
coastline is potentially significant with respect to the
potential for social conflict. As it is assumed that
aquaculture is most likely to occur in areas adjacent to
public coastline, it is important that such areas be as free
as possible of the influence of private coastline. However,
much of Cape Cod is similar to Truro; areas of public
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coastline tend to be relatively small, distributed
intermittently, and located adjacent to long stretches of
private coastline. Therefor, the percent and distribution
of private coastline are both considered in analyses of the
potential for social conflict related to private riparian
property.
It is also important to note that both PSI and current
indicator values are only preliminary estimators of the
potential for social conflict; the value 0.88 is not
considered to represent an absolute boundary that
definitively measures the potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property. In effect, the value
0.88 serves as a guideline for analysis. For the purpose of
analysis, table five (p.l08) lists current indicator values
with other variables pertinent to the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian property. A
comparative analysis of the variables listed in table five
is the basis for determining the relative potential for such
social conflict in each town on Cape Cod.
In the following section, the percent of public
coastline is included in abstracts of indicator data for
each town on Cape Cod. It is important to note that a
relatively high percent of public coastline in a town, does
not necessarily indicate that aquaculture is less likely to
be constrained. Public riparian property on Cape Cod is
characterized by federal, state, and town ownership, and
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policies regarding aquaculture for each parcel of public
riparian property are unknown. Policies prohibiting
aquaculture would confer public riparian property with an
even greater exclusionary nature than private riparian
property; in the case of private riparian property,
aquaculture is at least theoretically possible as shown in
the case of Hemilla (1996).
Finally, it is important to understand the meaning of
the potential for social conflict within the context of this
study. It is assumed that the potential for social conflict
is inherent in any case where different interest groups
compete for the same resource. In the case of private
riparian property and aquaculture, the relative availability
of sites that are removed from private riparian property is
a primary criteria regarding the relative potential for
social conflict. Relatively long stretches of public
coastline, and/or the presence of extensive tideflats
removed from private riparian property are considered to
represent opportunity to minimize the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian property. In addition,
town policies that limit aquaculture to areas removed from
private riparian property are considered to represent a
variable that may minimize the potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property. As a primary function
of policy making is to respond to potential conflicts, such
policies are also assumed to represent the acknowledged
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inherent potential for social conflict related to private
riparian property.
Trends in recent growth of aquaculture are considered
to represent the effectiveness of town policies to promote
aquaculture. As information related to the most recent
growth of aquaculture is limited to the period 1992-1994,
trends in growth during this period are examined. It is
important to note that growth of aquaculture does not
necessarily imply a relatively low potential for social
conflict. Rather, it may indicate an effective policy
response to a relatively high potential for social conflict.
For this reason, growth of aquaculture that is shown to be
related to town policies that represent a response to the
potential for social conflict, are considered to represent a
relatively high potential for social conflict. This applies
to both the potential for social conflict related to private
riparian property and shellfishing.
2. Shellfishing
The PSI value of the potential for social conflict
related to shellfishing was derived from Case One:
Shellfishingj Chatham, 1983. The PSI value is: 2614
shellfish permits/1134 acres of estuarine tideflats = 2.31.
This value represents an estimate of the demand for
shellfishing associated with a case in which shellfishing
was the source of social conflict that led to the withdrawal
of a proposed aquaculture venture.
88
While it is clear that the purchase of a shellfish
permit represents a demand for shellfishing, the inclusion
of total acreage of estuarine tideflats as a part of the
indicator requires clarification. As Case One showed,
shellfishers may oppose aquaculture despite the requirement
that it be located on tideflats that are unproductive of
shellfish. In effect, such opposition represents a
potential demand for all estuarine tideflats in a town,
implying that the potential for social conflict related to
shellfishing may apply to virtually all estuarine tideflats
on Cape Cod. In addition, with respect to this research,
estuarine tideflats are significant; virtually all
aquaculture and shellfishing on Cape Cod occurs in these
areas (Sherwood, 1996). As such, the total acreage of
estuarine tideflats per town is considered to represent a
meaningful part of the indicator of social conflict related
to shellfishing. Therefor, current indicator values equal
to or greater than 2.31 are considered to represent a
relatively high potential for social conflict related to
shellfishing.
As in the case of private riparian property, PSIs are
only preliminary estimators of the potential for social
conflict; the value 2.31 is not considered to represent an
absolute boundary that definitively measures the potential
for social conflict related to shellfishing. In effect, the
value 2.31 serves as a guideline for analysis. For the
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purpose of analysis, table six (p.125) lists current
indicator values with other variables pertinent to the
potential for social conflict related to shellfishing. A
comparative analysis of the variables listed in table six,
is the basis for determining the relative potential for such
social conflict in each town on Cape Cod.
Finally, it is important to understand the meaning of
the potential for social conflict related to shellfishing
within the context of this study. It is assumed that the
potential for social conflict is inherent when aquaculture
competes with shellfishing for the same resource. Because
aquaculture on Cape Cod is limited to tideflats that are
unproductive of shellfish, the presence of unproductive
tideflats may lessen the potential for social conflict
related to shellfishing. While Case One indicated that
shellfishers may oppose the proposed siting of aquaculture
on any tideflats, the current presence of 111 aquaculture
ventures located primarily on estuarine tideflats throughout
Cape Cod, tends to suggest that the potential for such
opposition may not absolutely preclude aquaculture.
However, the relative productivity of tideflats on Cape Cod
is currently unknown. Nonetheless, based upon the current
number of aquaculture ventures on Cape Cod, it is assumed
that at least some areas of tideflats are unproductive of
shellfish.
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In addition, marine tideflats are generally considered
to be available for aquaculture as they are relatively
unproductive of shellfish (Sherwood, 1996). Therefor, the
presence of large areas of marine tideflats is assumed to
represent potential opportunity to minimize social conflict
related to shellfishing. In addition, town policies that
limit aquaculture to tideflats that are determined to be
unproductive, are considered to represent a variable that
may minimize the potential for social conflict related to
shellfishing. As a primary function of policy making is to
respond to potential conflicts, such policies are also
assumed to represent inherent potential for social conflict
related to shellfishing. Trends in recent growth of
aquaculture are considered to represent the effectiveness of
town policies to promote aquaculture. As information
related to the most recent growth of aquaculture is limited
to the period 1992-1994, trends in growth during this period
are examined.
Information regarding the acreage of tideflats was
acquired from a 1985 coastal resource assessment survey that
was co-conducted by the Lloyd Center for Environmental
Studies and the Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management
Program (Hankin, et aI, 1985). At the time of this writing,
this represented the most recent data available, and it was
determined to be appropriate for the purpose of this study
(Rice, 1994). This data is particularly meaningful with
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respect to the PSI of the potential for shellfishing to
constrain aquaculture. The PSI is derived from Case One:
Chatham; 1983. The Lloyd Center/MCZMP study was initiated
shortly after 1983, and was completed more than one year
prior to the 1986 breakthrough of the Atlantic Ocean at
Chatham.
The other part of the ratio is the number of shellfish
permits issued per town in 1994. This information was
acquired from DMF and represents 1994 grouped data for
commercial, recreational, and senior citizen shellfish
permits. Grouped data was utilized, as it reflects current
conditions under which competition for shellfish resources
occurs; commercial, recreational, and senior citizen
shellfishing on Cape Cod occurs almost exclusively on
tideflats (Sherwood, 1996). Marine tideflats are generally
unproductive of shellfish, and are considered to be
relatively more available for aquaculture (Sherwood, 1996).
E. Abstracts of Infor.mation Related to Current Indicator
Values.
1. Barnstable
Barnstable is the largest town on Cape Cod, with an
area of 62 square miles. Barnstable has 689 acres of marine
tideflats, and 1,957 acres of estuarine tideflats (Hankin,
et aI, 1985, p.12). There are approximately 86 linear miles
of coastline in Barnstable; 55 miles are privately owned and
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31 are public property. The percent distribution of
coastline by ownership type is 0.64 private and 0.36 public.
On its north coast, a narrow band of tideflats extends
approximately 700 feet from the coastline to Cape Cod Bay
(NOAA Chart No.13246). Barnstable Harbor encompasses
approximately 670 acres of tideflats (Barnstable Harbor
Intertidal Flats Map, 1994). On its south coast, a band of
tideflats extends approximately 420 feet from the coastline
toward Vineyard Sound (NOAA Chart No.13237). Cotuit Bay,
North Bay, West Bay, and East Bay, are large, sheltered
embaYments, located along the southwest coast.
2. Bourne
Bourne is the fourth largest town on Cape Cod with an
area of 41 square miles. It has 35 acres of marine
tideflats, and 166 acres of estuarine tideflats (Hankin et
aI, 1985, p.12). There are approximately 62 linear miles of
coastline in Bourne; 57 miles are privately owned and five
are public property. The percent distribution of coastline
by ownership type is 0.92 private and 0.08 public.
Disregarding the Cape Cod Canal, its only water boundary is
with Buzzards Bay, which lacks the extensive tideflats of
Cape Cod Bay (NOAA Chart 13246) .
3. Brewster
Brewster is the sixth largest town on Cape Cod, with an
area of 25 square miles, and six miles of coastline.
Brewster has 2,532 acres of marine tideflats, and fifteen
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acres of estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et aI, 1985, p.12).
There are approximately six linear miles of coastline in
Brewster; four miles are privately owned and two are public
property. The percent distribution of coastline by
ownership type is 0.66 private and 0.33 public Its only
water boundary is to its north at Cape Cod Bay. A broad
expanse of tideflats extends approximately 1000 feet to 7000
feet from the coastline to Cape Cod Bay (NOAA Chart 13246).
The coastline lacks embaYffients, and is relatively straight
and uninterrupted.
4. Chatham
Chatham is the twelfth largest town on Cape Cod, with
an area of 17 square miles, and 70 miles of coastline.
Chatham has 1,098 acres of marine tideflats, and 1134 acres
of estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et aI, 1985, p.12). There
are approximately 70 linear miles of coastline in Chatham;
62 miles are privately owned and eight are public property.
The percent distribution of coastline by ownership type is
0.89 private and 0.11 public. A narrow band of tideflats
extends approximately 360 feet from the coastline of Nauset
Beach, a barrier beach, to the Atlantic Ocean (NOAA Chart
13248). Along Nantucket Sound, a narrow band of tideflats
extends approximately 420 feet from the coastline (NOAA
Chart 13229). Located at the southeast corner of Chatham,
Morris Island has a broad, convoluted expanse of tideflats
that extends at least 1000 feet from the coastline (NOAA
94
Chart 13248). Chatham Harbor is a large embayment that is
sheltered from the Atlantic Ocean by Nauset Beach. It is
surrounded by bands of tideflats. On its western boundary,
tideflats extend between 60 feet to 2200 feet from the
shoreline to Chatham Harbor, and on its eastern boundary
from 60 feet to 1040 feet (NOAA Chart 13248). In addition,
Chatham Harbor has several large expanses of tideflats.
5. Dennis
Dennis is the tenth largest town on Cape Cod, with an
area of 21 square miles, and 24 miles of coastline. Dennis
has 880 acres of marine tideflats, and 122 acres of
estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et al 1985, p.12). The are
approximately 24 linear miles of coastline in Dennis;
fifteen miles are privately owned and nine are public
property. The percent distribution of coastline by
ownership type is 0.63 private and 0.37 public. It has a
narrow band of tideflats along its northwest coast that
extends approximately 420 feet from the coastline to Cape
Cod Bay (NOAA Chart 13246). These tideflats expand
continuously to the east and extend approximately 4800 feet
from the coastline to Cape Cod Bay at their broadest point.
Sesuit Harbor, a narrow estuarine embayment is bounded at
its mouth by Cape Cod Bay (NOAA Chart 13246). On its south
coast, it has a narrow band of tideflats that extends
between approximately 210 feet to 1170 feet from the
coastline to Nantucket Sound (NOAA Chart 13329). Located at
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the border of Yarmouth, the Bass River heads inland from
Nantucket Sound to Grand Cove, a small sheltered embayment.
6. Easth~
Eastham is the fourteenth largest town on Cape Cod,
with an area of fourteen square miles and 35 miles of
coastline. Eastham has 2,275 acres of marine tideflats and
543 acres of estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et aI, 1985,
p.12). The are approximately 35 linear miles of coastline
in Eastham; 34 miles are privately owned and one is public
property. The percent distribution of coastline by
ownership type is 0.97 private and 0.03 public. Eastham has
a broad band of tideflats that extends between 2130 feet and
4200 feet from the coastline to Cape Cod Bay (NOAA Chart
13246). Eastham's entire boundary with Cape Cod Bay is
characterized by this relatively uniform band of tideflats.
Eastham has virtually no tideflats along its east which is
exposed to the Atlantic Ocean (NOAA Chart 13246). In
addition, Nauset Harbor, a large, convoluted, sheltered
embayment is located on the east coast of Eastham (NOAA
Chart 13246).
7. Falmouth
Falmouth is the second largest town on Cape Cod, with
an area of 46 square miles and 67 miles of coastline.
Falmouth has 127 acres of marine tideflats and 180 acres of
estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et ai, 1985, p.12). There are
approximately 67 linear miles of coastline in Falmouth; 47
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are privately owned and 20 are public property. The percent
distribution of coastline by ownership type is 0.70 private
and 0.30 public. Falmouth does not have any significant
tideflats along its border with Buzzards Bay or Vineyard
Sound (NOAA Chart 13230). Falmouth is characterized by
relatively sheltered embaYffients along both of its coasts,
particularly Vineyard Sound. From west to east
respectively, Little Pond, Great Pond, Green Pond, Bourne's
Pond, and Eel Pond are deeply indented narrow embaYffients
that border Vineyard Sound. Waquoit Bay is a more exposed
embaYffient that bounds Mashpee to the east (NOAA Chart
13237) .
8. Harwich
Harwich is the eighth largest town on Cape Cod, with an
area of 23 square miles, and ten miles of coastline.
Harwich has zero acres of marine tideflats, and zero acres
of estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et al, 1985, p.12). There
are approximately ten linear miles of coastline in Harwich;
nine miles are privately owned and one is public property.
The percent distribution of coastline by ownership type is
0.90 private and 0.10 public. Harwich has a water boundary
with Vineyard Sound, and the coast is relatively uniform and
lacks embaYffients (NOAA Chart 13229). Its largest body of
water on Vineyard Sound is the Herring River which bounds
Mashpee to the east (NOAA Chart 13229). In addition, Harwich
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is bounded by Pleasant Bay at its northeast corner (NOAA
Chart 13246).
9. Mashpee
Mashpee is the fifth largest town on Cape Cod, with an
area of 26 square miles, and 25 miles of coastline. Mashpee
has zero acres of marine tideflats, and 52 acres of
estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et aI, 1985, p.12). There are
approximately 25 linear miles of coastline in Mashpee; 20
miles are privately owned and five are public property. The
percent distribution of coastline by ownership type is 0.80
private and 0.20 public. Mashpee has only one water
boundary which is located along Vineyard Sound (NOAA Chart
13237). At its southwest corner Mashpee encompasses a
portion of Waquoit Bay, and at its southeast corner it
encompasses a portion of Popponessett Bay (NOAA Chart
13237).
10. Orleans
Orleans is the thirteenth largest town on Cape Cod,
with an area of 14 square miles, and 50 miles of coastline.
Orleans has 414 acres of marine tideflats, and 2,028 acres
of estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et aI, 1985, p.12). There
are approximately 50 linear miles of coastline in Orleans;
forty four miles are privately owned and six are public
property. The percent distribution of coastline by
ownership type is 0.88 and 0.12 public. A broad band of
tideflats along Cape Cod Bay extends approximately 3300 feet
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from the coastline (NOAA Chart 13246). Orleans has
virtually no tideflats along its boundary with the Atlantic
Ocean. However, adjacent to this coast, Orleans encompasses
the north half of Pleasant Bay which is sheltered from the
Atlantic Ocean by a barrier beach. Pleasant Bay is
characterized by narrow bands of tideflats along most of its
shoreline.
11. Provincetown
Provincetown is the smallest town on Cape Cod, with an
area of ten square miles, and 24 miles of coastline.
Provincetown has 43 acres of marine tideflats and 162 acres
of estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et aI, 1985, p.12). There
are approximately 24 miles of coastline in Provincetown, all
of which are privately owned. It has a narrow band of
tideflats that extends between approximately 300 feet and
2100 feet from the coastline to Provincetown Harbor (NOAA
Chart 13246). Along its boundary with Cape Cod Bay, a
narrow band of tideflats extends approximately 375 feet from
the coastline (NOAA Chart 13246). On its boundary with the
Atlantic Ocean, Provincetown has virtually no tideflats.
Hatches Harbor, a small sheltered embaYment is located at
the northwest corner of Provincetown (NOAA Chart 13246) ..
12. Sandwich
Sandwich is the third largest town on Cape Cod, with an
area of 44 square miles, and 16 miles of coastline.
Sandwich has zero acres of marine tideflats and seven acres
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of estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et al, 1985, p.12). There
are approximately 16 linear miles of coastline in Sandwich;
fourteen miles are privately owned and two are public
property. The percent distribution of coastline by
ownership type is 0.88 private and 0.12 public. It has
isolated stretches of tideflats the extend up to
approximately 300 feet from the coastline to Cape Cod Bay
(NOAA Chart 13246). Old Harbor, a sheltered riverine
estuary, is the only embaYment in Sandwich (NOAA Chart
13246). To its west, Sandwich is bounded by the Cape Cod
canal (NOAA Chart 13246) .
13. Truro
Truro is the ninth largest town on Cape Cod, with an
area of 22 square miles and 24 miles of coastline. Truro
has zero acres of marine tideflats and 93 acres of estuarine
tideflats (Hankin, et al, 1985, p.12). There are
approximately 24 linear miles of coastline in Truro; twenty
one miles are privately owned and three miles are public
property. The percent distribution of coastline by
ownership type is 0.88 private and 0.12 public. It has
discrete stretches of tideflats that extend approximately up
to 1680 feet from the coastline to Cape Cod Bay (NOAA Chart
13246). On its opposite coast with the Atlantic Ocean,
Truro has virtually no tideflats. The Pamet River is a




Wellfleet is the eleventh largest town on Cape Cod,
with an area of 20 square miles, and 37 miles of coastline.
Wellfleet has 1,107 acres of marine tideflats and 787 acres
of estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et aI, 1985, p.12). There
are approximately 37 linear miles of coastline in Wellfleet;
36 are privately owned and one is public property. The
percent distribution of coastline by ownership type is 0.98
private and 0.02 public. Wellfleet has a continuous stretch
of tideflats that extend approximately up to 1680 feet from
the coastline to Cape Cod Bay (NOAA Chart 13246). On its
opposite coast with the Atlantic Ocean, Wellfleet has
virtually no tideflats. In Wellfleet Harbor, extensive
tideflats extend to an approximate maximum of 2570 feet from
the shoreline (NOAA Chart 13250).
15. Yar.mouth
Yarmouth is the seventh largest town on Cape Cod, with
an area of 25 square miles and 29 miles of coastline.
Yarmouth has 1,065 acres of marine tideflats and 477 acres
of estuarine tideflats (Hankin, et aI, 1985, p.12). There
are approximately 29 linear miles of coastline in Yarmouth;
25 miles are privately owned and four are public property.
The percent distribution of coastline by ownership type is
0.86 and 0.14 private. It has a continuous stretch of
tideflats that extend to an approximate maximum of 7200 feet
from the coastline of Cape Cod Bay and taper in an easterly
101
direction to approximately 1000 feet from the coastline
(NOAA Chart 13246). Along Nantucket Sound, Yarmouth has
tideflats that range from approximately 420 to 1080 feet
from the coastline (NOAA Chart 13229). Yarmouth's
embaYffients are relatively small; Uncle Roberts Cove and
Lewis Pond are located on its boundary with Nantucket Sound
(NOAA Chart 13246), and Yarmouthport is located on Cape Cod
Bay (NOAA Chart 13250).
F. Analysis
1. Current Indicators of the Potential for Social
Conflict Related to Private Riparian Property.
Table five illustrates current indicator values for
each town on Cape Cod. The potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property is preliminarily
considered to be relatively high in towns that have a
current indicator value equal to or greater than 0.88, the
PSI value.
Other variables include the distribution of public
coastline, and the quantity, in acres, of both estaurine and
marine tideflats. These variables are included in order to
analyze their effect on the potential for social conflict.
The potential effect of both variables could be to lessen or
intensify the potential for social conflict. Long stretches
of public coastline may lessen the potential for social
conflict, as extensive areas of public property may
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facilitate siting aquaculture ventures that are removed from
private riparian property. It is assumed that the potential
for social conflict related to private riparian property is
relatively low when aquaculture ventures can be sited in
such areas.
The opposite is assumed in the case of an intermittent
distribution of relatively short stretches of public
coastline; the presence of extensive stretches of adjacent
private coastline may result in a relatively higher
potential for social conflict. It is assumed that the
potential for social conflict related to private riparian
property is relatively high when aquaculture ventures are
sited in the vicinity of extensive areas of private riparian
property.
A relatively large quantity of tideflats may lessen the
potential for social conflict; this characteristic may
facilitate siting aquaculture ventures that are removed from
private riparian property. It is assumed that the potential
for social conflict related to private riparian property is
relatively low when aquaculture ventures can be sited in
such areas. This may be most significant in cases where
such tideflats occur beyond 1,650 feet from the coastline;
this distance represents the seaward limit of private
riparian property in Massachusetts. Conversely, a
relatively small quantity of tideflats may intensify the
potential for social conflict.
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Marine tideflats are not typically utilized for
aquaculture, as they tend to be more exposed to wind,
waves, and ice. However, Brewster has recently sited
some aquaculture ventures on marine tideflats (Mant,
1996). While the potential for marine tideflats to
support aquaculture is currently uncertain, they are
generally considered to be available for aquaculture
(Sherwood, 1996). Therefor, a relatively large
quantity of marine tideflats, especially those that
occur beyond 1650 feet from the coastline, may lessen
the potential for social conflict in these areas. In
addition to the variables in table five, recent growth
trends (Table Four) in aquaculture are considered in
the following analyses. Further, town aquaculture
policies are considered where applicable.
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Table 5.
Variables Associated with the Potential for Social
Conflict Related to Private Riparian Property
Town Current Distribution of Acres of
Indicator Public Coastline Tideflats
Value
Estuarine/Marine
Barnstable 0.64 extensive 1,957 / 689
Bourne 0.92 intermittent 166 / 35
Brewster 0.66 intermittent 2,532 / 15
Chatham 0.89 extensive 1,098 /1,134
Dennis 0.63 intermittent 122 / 880
Eastham 0.97 intermittent 543 /2,275
Falmouth 0.94 intermittent 180 / 127
Harwich 0.90 intermittent 0 / 0
Mashpee 0.80 intermittent 52 / 0
Orleans 0.88 intermittent 414 /2,028
Provincetown 1. 00 intermittent 162 / 43
Sandwich 0.88 intermittent 7 / 0
Truro 0.88 intermittent 93 / 0
Wellfleet 0.98 intermittent 787 /1,107
Yarmouth 0.86 intermittent 477 /1,065
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Based upon current indicator values, it is
preliminarily assumed that the potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property is relatively high in
ten towns on Cape Cod. In addition, as the current
indicator value for Yarmouth is only .02 less than the PSI
value, it is preliminarily assumed that the potential for
social conflict is relatively high in Yarmouth. This tends
to suggest that the potential for social conflict with
respect to private riparian property is relatively high in
11 towns on Cape Cod. Other variables associated with the
potential for social conflict related to private riparian
property will be examined in order to clarify this
preliminary assumption.
Towns other than Yarmouth that have current indicator
values less than 0.88, are preliminarily assumed to have a
relatively low potential for social conflict related to
private riparian property. This applies to Barnstable,
Brewster, Dennis, and Mashpee. In Barnstable, a large
quantity of estuarine tideflats in the vicinity of a long
stretch of public coastline along Barnstable Harbor may
lessen the potential for social conflict in this area. Some
of these tideflats are located beyond 1650 feet from the
coastline. These conditions, and the town's policy to
promote aquaculture in areas removed from private riparian
property, and potential social conflict in general are
perceived to contribute to the recent growth of aquaculture
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in Barnstable (Marcotti, 1996). While the large quantity of
estuarine tideflats provides opportunity for aquaculture,
Barnstable's policy to limit aquaculture to these areas is
at least in part in response to the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian property (Marcotti,
1996). Therefor, the contention that the potential for
social conflict is relatively high is tentatively accepted
for Barnstable.
Brewster lacks long stretches of public coastline and
has only 15 acres of estuarine tideflats. However, a large
quantity of marine tideflats, including some that extend
beyond 1650 feet from the coastline has been considered in
town decisions regarding aquaculture. Brewster recently
developed a policy to promote the siting of aquaculture
ventures on marine tideflats (Mant, 1996). The recent
growth of aquaculture in Brewster has been attributed at
least partly to this policy (Mant, 1996). This policy was
implemented in response to the demand for estuarine
tideflats by shellfishing interests and the town's policy to
reserve portions of estuarine tideflats for town shellfish
propagation projects (Mant, 1996). The apparent lack of
evidence of social conflict related to private riparian
property, and a town policy that primarily addresses
shellfishing interests, tends to make conclusions regarding
the potential for social conflict in Brewster somewhat
tenuous. Therefor, the contention that the potential for
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social conflict related to private riparian property is
relatively high is tentatively considered to be uncertain
for Brewster.
Dennis is similar to Brewster with respect to the
distribution of public coastline, and the quantity of
estuarine tideflats. The distribution of public coastline
in Dennis is intermittent, and despite having 122 acres of
estuarine tideflats, most are located in the vicinity of
private riparian property (Marcy, 1996). However, similar
to Brewster, a large quantity of marine tideflats may lessen
the potential for social conflict related to private
riparian property. The current lack of aquaculture in
Dennis may be partly related to the current lack of a policy
to promote it. As demonstrated in Brewster, such a policy
may contribute to the growth of aquaculture. Because of
physical similarities with Brewster and the recent growth of
aquaculture in that town, it is tentatively assumed that
aquaculture could also grow in Dennis if marine tideflats
were targeted for aquaculture development.
Regarding the potential for social conflict related to
private riparian property in Dennis, it is contended that
insufficient evidence precludes a definitive conclusion.
Therefor, the contention that the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian property is relatively
high is tentatively considered to be uncertain for Dennis.
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Mashpee possesses some moderately long stretches of
public coastline that may lessen the potential for social
conflict in these areas. However, Mashpee has a relatively
small quantity of estuarine tideflats, and they tend to be
located close to the coastline. In addition, Mashpee has no
marine tideflats. The relative lack of opportunity to site
aquaculture ventures in areas removed from private coastline
may support the contention that the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian property is relatively
high in Mashpee. The current indicator value, 0.80, may
further support this contention. These variables may
suggest that the recent lack of growth of aquaculture in
Mashpee, is associated with a relatively high potential for
social conflict related to private riparian property.
However, the potential for multiple use conflict in
Mashpee may obscure the magnitude of the potential for
social conflict related to private riparian property. The
town's recent decision to deny a proposed aquaculture
venture was in response to increasing demand for in shore
waters from several sources, including recreation,
navigation, and shellfishing interests (York, 1996) The
town shellfish constable perceives the current potential for
multiple use conflict to be significant in inshore watersj
this has contributed to the town's de facto decision not to
target inshore waters for aquaculture (York, 1996). Further,
the town's recent consideration of the possibility of off
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shore aquaculture was in response to the potential for
multiple use conflict in inshore waters (York, 1996).
Nonetheless, evidence of the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian property in Mashpee has
been reported. A private riparian proprietor voiced
concerns related to the aesthetic impact of a shellfish
propagation project that was essentially a town managed
aquaculture venture (York, 1996). Despite this, and the
preceding variables that may suggest a relatively high
potential for social conflict related to private riparian
property, conclusions regarding this are somewhat tenuous
with respect to the potential for multiple use conflict.
Further, ambiguity is inherent in the possibility that
the potential for multiple use conflict includes the
potential for social conflict related to private riparian
property. It may be arguable that the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian property is relatively
high in Mashpee. However, as mentioned above, the potential
presence of multiple use conflict in Mashpee may obscure the
relative magnitude of the potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property. Therefor, the
contention that the potential for social conflict related to
private riparian property is relatively high is tentatively
considered to be uncertain for Mashpee.
Of the towns that are preliminarily assumed to have a
relatively high potential for social conflict related to
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private riparian property, Truro may represent the case in
which this assumption is most tenable. This is based upon
the finding that private riparian property was identified as
the cause of the denial of the proposed aquaculture venture
in Case Two. The fact that Case Two occurred in 1994 tends
to further support the contention that the potential for
social conflict related to private riparian property is
relatively high in Truro. Therefor, the contention that the
potential for social conflict is relatively high is
tentatively accepted for Truro.
Of the remaining towns with current indicator values
equal to or greater than 0.88, only Chatham has any areas of
extensive stretches of public coastline. Although it is
assumed that this may lessen the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian property, the
demonstrated potential of social conflict related to
shellfishing to constrain aquaculture in Chatham may obscure
its potential to constrain aquaculture. It is likely that
the recent lack of growth of aquaculture in Chatham is most
closely related to the potential for social conflict related
to shellfishing. In addition, the town's policy to exclude
aquaculture from estuarine embaYffients may also obscure the
potential for social conflict related to private riparian
property. Further, a large quantity of marine tideflats may
lessen the potential for such social conflict in Chatham.
Therefor, the contention that the potential for social
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conflict related to private riparian property is relatively
high is tentatively considered to be uncertain for Chatham.
Eastham, Orleans, Provincetown, and Wellfleet, are
towns with relatively high current indicator values.
However, each town shows recent growth of aquaculture.
Several factors have contributed to this growth. All four
towns have a large quantity of estuarine tideflats,
including large portions that are removed from private
coastline. While aquaculture is not currently sited on
marine tideflats in these towns, Eastham has 2,275 acres,
Orleans has 414 acres, and Provincetown has 43 acres of
marine tideflats. Wellfleet has no marine tideflats.
Although some of these factors may lessen the potential for
social conflict related to private riparian property, an
examination of each towns' aquaculture policies tends to
suggest that the potential for social conflict related to
private riparian property is relatively high in some of
these towns.
Eastham has recently imposed a de facto moratorium on
new aquaculture proposals due to unresolved potential
problems related to the prevalence of private riparian
property in areas that are considered to be appropriate for
aquaculture (Lind, 1996).
In Orleans, some aquaculture ventures are located on
private tideflats, but only under the terms of a legal
contract with the owners of the tideflats. In addition,
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recent aquaculture ventures have been sited on tideflats
removed from private riparian property, at least partly to
avoid potential social conflict related to private riparian
property (Jamieson, 1996).
Provincetown's current policy of limiting aquaculture
leases to certain tideflats in the "west end" of town is at
least partly due to the lack of adjacent private riparian
property at this location (Benjamin, 1996). In addition,
Provincetown has adopted a policy to site all future
aquaculture ventures in areas that are potentially free of
social conflict related to private riparian property
(Benjamin, 1996).
In Wellfleet, the town's recent policy to site
aquaculture ventures on public tideflats was in response to
complaints from private riparian proprietors that emerged
after the SJC's decision in the Pazzolt case (Somerville,
1996). The recent siting of aquaculture ventures near Egg
Island was based upon the availability of public tideflats
in that area, and a lack of adjacent private riparian
property (Somerville, 1996).
While aquaculture has experienced recent growth in
these towns, it has been at least partly associated with
policies that address the potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property. In Eastham and
Wellfleet, the occurrence of moratoriums was directly
related to the potential for such social conflict. While
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the potential for social conflict related to private
riparian property has at least temporarily halted
aquaculture in Eastham, it at least continues to constrain
it in Provincetown and Wellfleet. In effect, the potential
for social conflict related to private riparian property
excludes aquaculture from certain areas in Provincetown and
Wellfleet. In addition, aquaculture ventures occur on
private tideflats in Orleans only because the interests of
private riparian proprietors are legally protected.
Therefor, the contention that the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian property is relatively
high is tentatively accepted for Eastham, Orleans,
Provincetown, and Wellfleet.
Although Yarmouth has a current indicator value
slightly less than 0.88, as previously mentioned, it is
preliminarily accepted that the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian is relatively high in
Yarmouth. Variables supporting this contention are
generally lacking. While the general distribution of public
coastline is intermittent, some areas of moderately long
stretches of public coastline do occur. In addition,
Yarmouth has 477 acres of estuarine tideflats, and 1,065
acres of marine tideflats. Marine tideflats in Yarmouth
have large portions that are removed from private coastline,
including some that extend beyond 1650 feet from the
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coastline. These variables may lessen the potential for
social conflict related to private riparian property.
Yarmouth has not experienced recent growth of
aquaculture. While Yarmouth is generally supportive of
aquaculture, it is considered a secondary priority with
respect to shellfishing and navigation interests (Montague,
1995). Nonetheless, the town has recently begun to examine
the potential for siting sea clam aquaculture ventures on
marine tideflats in Cape Cod Bay (Montague, 1995). The
decision to target marine tideflats in Cape Cod Bay is at
least partly related to the perception that the potential
for social conflict is minimal in this area (Montague,
1995) .
Consideration of the potential for social conflict was
included in the town's tentative plan to target these marine
tideflats for aquaculture. Due to a recent conflict between
a private riparian proprietor and an aquaculturist, the town
is aware of the potential for social conflict related to
private riparian property. The proprietor objected to the
potential siting of an aquaculture venture on his tideflats
because they were designated as a conservation area
(Montague, 1995).
Yarmouth is similar to Brewster in its response to the
potential for social conflict. Both towns have a large
quantity of marine tideflats, including extensive areas that
are removed from private riparian property. In addition,
115
both towns have policies to target these areas for
aquaculture. However, Yarmouth has experienced social
conflict related to private riparian property; its
aquaculture policy response is predicated partly upon
addressing strategies for minimizing the potential for such
social conflict. Therefor, the contention that the
potential for social conflict related to private riparian
,
property is relatively high is tentatively accepted for
Yarmouth.
Bourne and Falmouth also have indicator values greater
than 0.88, and both are similar to Mashpee with respect to
the potential for multiple use conflict. In Bourne, a
proposed off bottom aquaculture venture was denied in 1988,
due primarily to the magnitude of multiple use conflict
(Merritt, 1996). In Falmouth, a virtually identical
proposed aquaculture venture was submitted in 1990. As in
the case of Bourne, the proposed venture was denied due
primarily to multiple use conflict (Souza, 1996). In both
cases, interests in private riparian property were among the
more prevalent sources of opposition to the proposed
ventures.
In addition, both towns have variables that may further
support the contention that the potential for social
conflict related to private riparian property is relatively
high. One variable is the intermittent distribution of
relatively small areas of public coastline that are adjacent
116
to long stretches of private coastline. The other is that
both towns lack large quantities of either estuarine or
marine tideflats. Regarding the recent growth of
aquaculture, Bourne shows negative growth, and Falmouth
shows no growth.
Despite this, other variables further support the
contention that the potential for multiple use conflict is
relatively high in both towns. At the time of this writing,
neither town had established policies to limit aquaculture
to areas that are relatively free of the potential for
social conflict. However, a recent attempt by Bourne to
designate such an area of Buttermilk Bay for aquaculture was
met with public opposition from several sources (Merritt,
1996). This tends to suggest that the current potential for
multiple use conflict is relatively high in Bourne. Similar
evidence in Falmouth may be lacking due to the town's
current hesitance to promote aquaculture development.
However, this is primarily due to the town's sensitivity to
the potential for multiple use conflict (Souza, 1996).
Similar to Mashpee, conclusions regarding the current
potential for social conflict related to private riparian
property in these towns are subject to the potential for
social conflict related to multiple use conflict. Therefor,
the contention that the potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property is relatively high is
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tentatively considered to be uncertain for Bourne and
Falmouth.
The remaining towns with current indicator values equal
to or greater than 0.88 are Harwich and Sandwich. Both
towns essentially lack opportunity to site aquaculture
ventures; Harwich has no estuarine or marine tideflats, and
Sandwich has seven acres of estuarine tideflats, and no
marine tideflats. In addition, both towns have an
intermittent distribution of public coastline, which is
characterized by small public parcels that are adjacent to
long stretches of private coastline.
Neither town has shown recent growth of aquaculture,
and both lack policies to promote it. While the lack of
opportunity is probably the primary constraint to
aquaculture in these towns, Harwich is willing to approve
sub-tidal aquaculture ventures that do not interfere with
existing uses of water resources (Leach, 1996).
Nonetheless, sufficient evidence to make a definitive
conclusion regarding the potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property is lacking. Therefor,
the contention that the potential for social conflict
related to private riparian property is relatively high is
tentatively considered to be uncertain for Harwich and
Sandwich.
This analysis tends to support the contention that the
potential for social conflict related to private riparian
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property is relatively high in seven towns on Cape Cod.
This contention is uncertain in eight towns.
2. Current Indicators of the Potential for Social
Conflict Related to Shellfishing
Table six illustrates current indicator values for each
town on Cape Cod. The potential for social conflict related
to shellfishing is preliminarily considered to be relatively
high in towns that have a current indicator value equal to
or greater than 2.31.
Other variables include the quantity, in acres, of both
estaurine and marine tideflats, and the presence or absence
of broad expanses of both types of tideflats. These
variables are included in order to analyze their effect on
the potential for social conflict. For the purpose of this
study, it is important to clarify terminology related to
tideflats. The quantity of tideflats is related to the
total acreage of tideflats in a town, while the presence or
absence of broad expanses of tideflats is related specific
portions of tideflats.
It is assumed that the occurrence of tideflats that are
unproductive of shellfish is relatively higher in towns with
relatively larger quantities of tideflats. The value of
unproductive tideflats is that aquaculture on Cape Cod is
limited to such areas. It is further assumed that large
quantities of tideflats may include relatively large areas
of unproductive tideflats. The value of broad expanses of
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unproductive tideflats is that aquaculture ventures may be
limited to such areas. This may lessen the potential for
social conflict related to shellfishing. Conversely, it is
assumed that a relatively small quantity of tideflats and/or
the lack of broad expanses of unproductive tideflats, may
intensify the potential for social conflict related to
shellfishing.
Provincetown provides a potential model for promoting
the growth of aquaculture; recent growth of aquaculture in
Provincetown is perceived to be related to the town's policy
to limit aquaculture to a single broad expanse of
unproductive tideflats and to reserve other tideflats for
existing uses (Benjamin, 1996). In addition, the chairman
of the Provincetown Shellfish Advisory Committee attributes
the lack of social conflict to this policy (Benjamin, 1996).
In addition to the variables in table six, recent
growth trends (Table Four) in aquaculture are considered in
the following analyses. Further, town aquaculture policies
are considered where applicable.
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Table 6.
variables Associated with the Potential
for Social Conflict Related to Shellfishing
Town Current Quantity of Broad Expanses
Indicator Tideflats of Tideflats
Value
Estuarine/Marine Estuarine / Marine
Barnstable 1. 61 1,957 / 689 yes / yes
Bourne 11.64 166 / 35 no / no
Brewster 37.80 15 /2,532 no / yes
Chatham 2.01 1,134 /1,098 yes / yes
Dennis 4.29 122 / 880 no / yes
Eastham 3.43 543 /2,275 yes / yes
Falmouth 12.46 180 / 127 no / no
Harwich n/a 0 / 0 no / no
Mashpee 11.88 52 / 0 no / no
Orleans 0.76 414 /2,028 yes / yes
Provincetown 1. 26 162 / 43 yes / no
Sandwich n/a 7 / 0 no / no
Truro 2.25 93 / 0 yes / no
Wellfleet 1.26 787 /1,107 yes / yes
Yarmouth 1. 93 477 /1,065 yes / yes
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Based upon current indicator values, it is
preliminarily assumed that the potential for social conflict
related to shellfishing is relatively high in six towns on
Cape Cod. In addition, as the current indicator value for
Truro is only .06 less than the PSI value, it is
preliminarily assumed that the potential for such social
conflict is relatively high in Truro. This tends to suggest
that the potential for social conflict related to
shellfishing is relatively high in seven towns on Cape Cod.
Other variables associated with the potential for social
conflict related to shellfishing are examined to further
clarify preliminary assumptions regarding the potential for
such social conflict in each town on Cape Cod. Harwich
and Sandwich do not have current indicator values, as
Harwich lacks both estuarine and marine tideflats, and 1994
data for the number shellfish permits is not available for
Sandwich. It may be that the lack of recent growth of
aquaculture in both towns is related to the quantity of
tideflats; Harwich has no tideflats and Sandwich has only
seven acres of estuarine tideflats. In addition, neither
town has developed an aquaculture policy. These variables
make conclusions regarding the potential for social conflict
related to shellfishing somewhat tenuous. Therefor,
assumptions regarding the potential for such social conflict
for Harwich and Sandwich are not made.
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Of the towns with indicator values less than 2.31,
Chatham may represent the most tenable case regarding the
contention that the potential for social conflict related to
shellfishing is relatively high. This is based partly upon
the finding that shellfishing was identified as the cause of
the withdrawal of the proposed aquaculture venture in Case
One. More importantly, Chatham continues to enforce its
policy of excluding aquaculture from estuarine tideflats
(Moore, 1996).
In addition, it is probably unlikely that the recent
lack of growth of aquaculture is related to a lack of
opportunity; Chatham has a large quantity of both estuarine
and marine tideflats, including broad expanses of both types
of tideflats. As such, it is assumed that the recent lack
of growth of aquaculture is related to Chatham's current
aquaculture policy. Therefor, the contention that the
potential for social conflict related to shellfishing is
relatively high is tentatively accepted for Chatham.
The remaining towns with an indicator value less than
2.31 possess variables that may lessen the potential for
social conflict related to shellfishing. Barnstable,
Orleans, Provincetown, Wellfleet, and Yarmouth all have a
relatively large quantity of estuarine tideflats, and except
for Provincetown, they also have a relatively large quantity
of marine tideflats. Recent growth of aquaculture has
occurred in each town except Yarmouth. In Barnstable,
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
It is commonly acknowledged that social conflict
presents potential constraints to aquaculture on Cape Cod.
However, the presence of potential social conflict is often
observed after the fact. The emergence of social conflict
in response to aquaculture, has discouraged both towns and
private citizens from subsequently pursuing potentially
beneficial opportunities. In part, this is due to
uncertainty regarding the potential for social conflict. It
is contended that the potential for social conflict with
respect to aquaculture, is relatively high on Cape Cod.
METHODOLOGY
This study is based on the qualitative case study
method as defined by Merriam (1988, p.9). Unlike
experimental, survey, or historical research, qualitative
case study does not claim to any particular methods for data
collection or data analysis (Merriam, 1988, p.10). Any and
all methods of gathering data from testing to interviewing
can be used in a qualitative case study (Merriam, 1988,
p.10). The data for this study includes public comments,l
written correspondence, and interviews. In addition,
qualitative case studies allow the use of both qualitative
and quantitative data. Quantitative data used in this study
includes the mileage of coastline and the acreage of
tideflats. The decision to focus on qualitative case
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studies stems from the fact that researchers are interested
in insight, discovery, and interpretation, rather than
hypothesis testing (Merriam, 1988, p.10). In addition,
qualitative case study is a design particularly suited to
situations where it is impossible to separate the
phenomenon's variables from their context (Merriam, 1988,
p.10). McNally-Wright found the qualitative case study
method suitable to her study of public criticism and the
Massachusetts Chapter 91 program, which was "a study of the
dYnamic interaction between a large number of participants
over the seven years of program development within a
specific context" (McNally-Wright, 1992, p.4). Similarly,
this research is a study of interactions between a large
number of participants, potential aquaculturists and their
opponents, over a 22 year period (1973-1994) on Cape Cod. In
addition, qualitative case studies require boundaries
(Merriam, 1988, p.9-10). Nineteen seventy-three provides a
meaningful origin for this study as it marks the beginning
of "modern" aquaculture on Cape Cod; Chapter 130 of the
General Laws of Massachusetts was amended in 1973 to address
advances in aquaculture technology. Nineteen ninety-four




THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND PRIVATE RIPARIAN RIGHTS
A. Introduction
Aquaculture on Cape Cod is subject to private and
public rights in estuarine waters and tideflats. Public
rights include the easements of fishing, fowling, and
navigation along the shore, while private riparian rights
are a special class of rights that are vested in private
ownership of riparian property. In Massachusetts, certain
activities related to private riparian rights may result in
the extinguishment of public easements in private tideflats
and tidewaters. Accordingly, a discussion of the public
trust doctrine and private riparian rights is instructive
for understanding the basis for social conflict related to
aquaculture on Cape Cod. This chapter outlines the origin
and development of these legal principles from ancient times
to the present in the United States. In addition, a review
of Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) case law
illustrates the dynamic relationship between these
principles, and intimates their effect on aquaculture on
Cape Cod.
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B. Historic Development of the Public Trust Doctrine and
Private Riparian Rights
The public trust doctrine in Massachusetts is derived
from the Institutes of Justinian, which were codified
between 529 and 534 A.D. (Slade (ed.), 1990, p.xvii). This
Roman civil law insured that all citizens had free use of
the waters and shores of the sea (Slade (ed.), 1990,
p.xvii). This legal character was lost with the collapse of
the Roman empire; the shoreline and other marine resources
fell into private ownership (Lahey, 1985, p.56).
During the subsequent feudal period the Crown of
England claimed title to the shore, including the authority
to grant private ownership in portions of it to subjects
(Lahey, 1985, p.56). However, the grievance that this
interfered with navigation and commerce was a leading cause
for the signing of the Magna Carta2 (Boston Waterfront
Development Corporation v. Commonwealth 393 N.E.2d 356, 358,
1979) .
After the Magna Carta, a legal theory developed in
England which divided the Crown's title to land below the
mean low water line into two distinct interests. The first
was a proprietory jus privatum interest, or right of
property in the soil, which the King could grant to a
private party subject to the jus publicum (New England Law
Review (16) 1, 1980, p.114). The second was called the jus
publicum, or royal prerogative, by which the King held this
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land in his sovereign capacity in trust for all subjects and
their free exercise of the common right rights of navigation
and fishing (Commonwealth v. Alger 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53,
90, 1853). The jus publicum could not be granted to a
subject without an act of Parliament, so it was eventually
understood to be under the sole control of the Parliament,
while the jus privatum remained vested in the King
(Commonwealth v. Alger 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 90, 1853).
Endowed with this theory, English common law passed to the
Massachusetts Bay Colony via the Crown's right of discovery
(Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451,
478, 1857). The companies chartered to settle the colony
were appointed as agents of the Crown by James I and Charles
II. They were empowered with:
"full dominion over all the ports, rivers, creeks,
and havens, etc. in as full and ample measure as
they were before held by the Crown of England"
(Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 pick.)
180, 182, 1822).
This vested both the jus privatum and jus publicum in the
charter companies. The Massachusetts Bay Colony Ordinance
of 1641 was included in the colony's original Body of
Liberties, and it adopted the jus publicum of English common
law:
"Every Inhabitant that is an howse holder shall
have free fishing and fowling in any great ponds
and Bayes, Coves and rivers, so farre as the sea
ebbes and flowes within the presincts of the towne
where they dwell, unlesse the free men of the same
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Towne or the Generall Court have otherwise
appropriated them," ... (The Book of General Laws
and Libertyes , at 50, 1649).
However, the jus publicum in the Massachusetts Bay Colony
diverged from English common law when the General Court
amended the Colony Ordinance of 1641 in 1647:
... [I]t is declared that in all creeks, coves, and
other places, about and upon salt water where the
Sea ebs and flows, the Proprietor of the land
adjoyning shall have propertie to the low water
mark where the Sea does not ebb above a hundred
rods3 , and not more wheresoever it ebs
farther" ... (The Book of the General Lawes and
Libertyes 50, 1649).
This produced a significant change in the legal character of
tideflats adjacent to private riparian property; private
riparian proprietors could now possess a fee simple title in
tideflats adjacent to their upland property. The object of
the ordinance was to promote marine commerce, and the
provision that created fee simple title in tideflats
acquiesced to the Massachusetts Bay Colony's inability to
fund the construction of wharfs {Storer v. Freeman 6 Mass.
(6 Tyng) 435, 438, 1810). The significance of this
provision is that it included the fundamental right of
private proprietors to exclude the public from their land.
The effect of the Colony Ordinance of 1647 on public rights
in private tidelands and associated tidewaters was that they
became conditional. However, public rights in submerged
lands4 , and in waters located below the seaward limit of
private riparian property remained absolute.
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The Colony Ordinance of 1647 had not been amended since
that year, and was subsequently recognized by Massachusetts'
highest court as a part of the state's common law:
"This ordinance was annulled (after the American
Revolution) with the charter by the authority of
which it was made; but from that time to the
present, a usage has prevailed, which now has
force as our common law... " (Storer v. Freeman 6
Mass. (6 TYng) 438, 181C}.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has clearly
indicated its support for this decision. In a landmark
case, the court distinguished the authority of the states to
amend colonial laws, and upheld the validity of such laws:
"The common law of England ... at the time of the
emigration of our ancestors, is the law of this
country, except so far as it has been modified by
the charters, constitutions, statutes, or usages
of the several Colonies ... When the Revolution took
place, the people of each state became themselves
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute
right to all their navigable waters, and the soil
under them for their own common use, subject only
to the rights since surrendered by the
Constitution" (Shively v. Bowlby 152 U.S. 1, 14,
15, 1894).
As this decision relates to Massachusetts, the Colony
Ordinance of 1647 describes the current relationship between
the public trust doctrine and private riparian rights. This
relationship has been a frequent topic of adjudication by
the SJC. The following review of the resultant case law
highlights some important legal concepts that further define
the relationship between these legal principles.
Understanding this relationship is necessary to
understanding aquaculture on Cape Cod; virtually all
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aquaculture on Cape Cod occurs on public trust lands or on
private tideflats. The following cases address principles
of the public trust doctrine, while a subsequent section
addresses principles of private riparian rights.
C. The Public Trust Doctrine: Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court
In Commonwealth v. Coombs (2 Mass. Rep. 4922, 1807) the
SJC found several procedural irregularities in a Court of
Sessions order to construct a bridge in the town of
Brunswick. While these errors were found to be sufficient
ground upon which to invalidate the order, the SJC furthered
emphasized that the bridge was unlawful, as it was partly
located over a navigable river. In addressing this point,
the SJC cited the character of navigable water as a
controlling factor in this dispute:
"The statute gives a general authority to the
Sessions to layout highwaysi but the statute must
have a reasonable construction. This authority
therefore cannot be extended to laying out of a
highway over a navigable river whether the water
be fresh or salt, so that the river may be
obstructed by a bridge. A navigable river is, of
common right, a public highwaYi and a general
authority to layout a new highway must not be so
extended so as to give a power to obstruct an open
highway already in the use of the public"
(Commonwealth v. Coombs 2 Mass. Rep. 492, 1807).
This decision protected the public right in navigation, and
recognized that this right is inherent in navigable waters.
In addition, the SJC implied that activities in public trust
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areas, are subject to the purposes of the public trust
doctrine.
In Gray v. Bartlett (20 pick. 186, 1838), the SJC ruled
against the plaintiff's claim of a right to utilize a
portion of his wharf that extended below the mean low water
line. The plaintiff made this claim under an assumed
acquired private right of easement against the defendant.
This claim was contended on the basis that the extension,
which was shown to obstruct navigation to the defendant's
wharf, had been constructed openly and with the acquiescence
of the defendant's grantor. In addition, the plaintiff
claimed that the extension did not damage the public right
in navigation, as it was not an actual obstruction to
navigation. In rejecting these claims the SJC described
their inadequacy as applied to the locus in which the
extension of the wharf occurred:
"The principle of prior occupancy ... and the
acquiescence of the ancestors of the defendant,
does not apply to any part of the premises in
controversy, below low-water mark, because, as to
that the possession was not adverse ... It was a
public domain, over which Mr. Parkman had no
control; and his right to use it, was a right in
common with all the rest of the community ... "
(Gray v. Bartlett (20 pick. 186, 1838).
The implication of this decision is that private rights in
areas below the mean low water line are unlawful, as such
areas are the domain of the public trust doctrine.
The case of Drake v. Curtis (1 Cush. 395,413, 1848)
distinguished the character of public rights in the area
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above the mean low water line from the area below this line.
The plaintiff claimed that the public's use of the
tidewaters above his private tideflats for the purpose of
sailing, amounted to a disseisin. 5
While the SJC rejected this claim, it recognized the
unique relationship between the public trust doctrine and
private riparian rights in tidewaters in Massachusetts:
"The constitution of the (colony) ordinance (of
1647) ... has been, that, although such (private
riparian) proprietor has a fee in the soil of the
flats, he holds it sub modo; he may build a wharf
or other permanent structure upon it, or he may
enclose it with rows of piles, so as to other
persons from sailing over it; yet, until he does
so, whilst the tide is in, and the flats covered,
it is public navigable water" (Drake v. Curtis 1
Cush. 395,413, 1848).
The implication for the public right of easements in
fishing, fowling, and navigation, in tidewaters lying above
private tideflats, is that they are extinguished upon the
enclosure of such tideflats.
While Drake v. Curtis (1 Cush. 395,413, 1848) upheld a
conditional limit to the public trust doctrine, Commonwealth
v. Alger (7 Cush. 53, 1851) upheld its ultimate paramounce.
The question in this case centered on a portion of the
defendant's wharf which extended beyond a harbor line6 in
Boston Harbor. The harbor line had been established by a
series of acts and resolves,? and was intended to protect
the public right in navigation in Boston Harbor by
preventing encroachments beyond it. The defendant claimed
that as the wharf was located within the boundaries of his
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private tideflats, it was lawful under the Colony Ordinance
of 1647. In addition, it was claimed that the wharf was not
an actual obstruction to navigation as it did not extend
significantly beyond the harbor line.
While the SJC recognized the Colony Ordinance of 1647
as authorizing private riparian proprietors to build
structures within the boundaries of their tideflats, it
qualified that its authority is:
" ... subject, however, to the reasonable use of
other individual proprietors and of the public for
the purposes of navigation; ... " (Commonwealth v.
Alger 7 Cush. 53, 1851).
The SJC interpreted this to mean that the public purpose of
the harbor line statutes overruled private riparian rights
in tideflats. In rejecting the claims of the defendant in
this case, the SJC upheld the right of the legislature to
make the harbor line statutes regardless of their effect on
the defendant's private riparian rights:
" ... the act of fixing a line within the harbor of
Boston, beyond which no proprietor should erect a
wharf or other permanent structure, although to
some extent it prohibited him from building such
structures on flats of which he owned in fee, was
a constitutional law, and one which was competent
for the legislature to make; that it was binding
on the defendant, and rendered him obnoxious to
its penalties, if he violated his provisions"
(Commonwealth v. Alger 7 Cush. 104, 1851).
In addition, the issue of whether the wharf was an actual
obstruction to navigation was deemed immaterial. The SJC's
decision in Commonwealth v. Alger (7 Cush. 53, 1851)
demonstrates that the geographic reach of the public trust
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doctrine extends beyond the limit of the mean low water
line. Theoretically, the legislature is authorized to
completely impinge upon the private rights of private
riparian proprietors for the purpose of protecting the
public right in navigation.
In Crocker v. Champlin (202 Mass. 437, 1909), the
plaintiff complained that the construction of a dam had
permanently flooded his private tideflats. His complaint
was based upon the resultant diminution of value of his
tideflats. The SJC agreed with this assessment, but
rejected the plaintiff's claim that this amounted to a
taking:
"The owners of flats in this Commonwealth acquired
by the Colony Ordinance of 1647 hold them subject
to the right of the Commonwealth to cover them
with deep water by means of a permanent dam
maintained for purposes of navigation, and their
diminution in value from being thus permanently
covered with water is not a taking of property
from the owners" (Crocker v. Champlin 202 Mass.
437,1909).
This comment clarifies the intimation of Commonwealth v.
Alger (7 Cush. 53, 1851). Namely, a legislative decision to
promote or protect the public right in navigation that
results in the deprivation of a private riparian
proprietor's right in private property, does not result in a
taking. Black's law dictionary defines a taking as a
governmental action that directly interferes with or
substantially disturbs a property owner of the use and
enjoYment of their property. While a strict interpretation
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of this definition appears to establish that a taking had
occurred in Crocker v. Champlin (202 Mass. 437, 1909), the
effect of the public trust doctrine on the principle of
taking is evident in this case; the private riparian
proprietor is left without recourse with respect to a
potential claim of damage to his property value. This
illustrates the significance of the public trust doctrine as
a legal principle that protects and promotes public rights
in easements in private riparian property in Massachusetts.
In Barry v. Grela (372 Mass. 278, 1977), the plaintiff
claimed a right to walk across private tideflats in order to
reach a public jetty for the purpose of fishing. This case
was decided in favor of the plaintiff. The SJC ruled that
as an appurtenance to the established public right to an
easement in shellfishing on private riparian property, the
act of walking upon private tideflats for this purpose was
lawful. The SJC related its decision to the established
right of the public to shellfishing on private tideflats
when covered by water; no difficulty was found in applying
this principle to the instant case:
"In ... Packard the (shell) fishing was done by
people who came by boat. But we think the same
principle applies to access over flats on foot to
property of others, so long as the purpose is
"fishing". In Opinion of the Justices, (365 Mass.
681, 687, 1974), we said, "We are unable to find
any authority that the rights of the public
include a right to walk on the beach". But that
language is not to be taken as limiting the right
of fishing." (Barry v. Grela 37 Mass. 278, 1977).
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It is important to emphasize that the SJC's decision in this
case was based upon the fact that the access was appurtenant
to a public right in an easement to fishing on private
riparian property. The SJC has consistently ruled against
access to private riparian property that is not appurtenant
to public rights in easements. s
In the final case of this section, Boston Waterfront
Development Corporation v. Commonwealth (393 N.E.2d 356,
1979), the SJC handed down a landmark decision that showed
the immutable nature of the public trust doctrine in
Massachusetts. The dispute in this case centered on the
planned development of condominiums on a parcel of private
riparian property in Boston Harbor. The parcel, which
carried a fee simple title by statute9 , was located on
submerged land. While the SJC recognized the nature of
ownership in the parcel, it ruled that its use was:
"subject to a condition subsequent that it be used
for the public purpose for which it was
granted ... to promote trade and commerce by
enabling and encouraging the owners of flats to
build wharves, warehouses, and other structures
thereon for the use and convenience of those
[utilize] ... the ports and harbors" (Boston
Waterfront Development Corporation v. Commonwealth
393 N.E.2d 356, 1979).
A counter argument to this opinion was that such a
construction of the public purpose intended by the statutes
was too narrow with respect to current demand for the
property:
"Restricting the use of Lewis Wharf to conformity
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with this purpose severely encumbers the land
because this purpose was conceived at a time when
Boston was a booming shipping port. Shipping, or
"commerce marine" no longer constitutes a large
part of the demand for waterfront property in
Boston. Recently, this land has been in much
greater demand for residential and business
purposes" ... (Boston Waterfront Development
Corporation v. Commonwealth 393 N.E.2d 356, 1979).
The diametrically opposed perspectives of the SJC and the
Boston Waterfront Development Corporation reflect the nature
of the dispute in this case: ancient principles of the
public trust doctrine were challenged by modern private
economic interests. In its analysis, the SJC relied upon
precedent from the highest judicial authority.
In a landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court
limited the use of certain submerged lands in Chicago Harbor
to the express intent of the statute which conveyed them
(Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 1892).
The statute promoted the public purpose of erecting wharves
and docks for the improvement of navigation and marine
commerce. with respect to the instant case, this represented
a direct precedent as the dispute in both cases was
virtually identical.
Finally, the SJC intimated the effect of its decision
on parcels similar to the one which was the subject of the
dispute in the instant case:
"land below low-water line can be granted only to
fulfill a public purpose, and the rights of the
grantee to that land are ended when that purpose
is extinguished, and voidable when that purpose is
not being carried out" (Boston Waterfront
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Development Corporation v. Commonwealth 393 N.E.2d
356, 1979).
The purpose of this discussion was twofold: to illustrate
the scope and significance of the public trust doctrine in
Massachusetts, and to introduce some of its aspects that are
of importance to aquaculture.
One of these aspects was introduced in Commonwealth v.
Coombs (2 Mass. Rep. 492, 1807). The implication for
aquaculture in this case, is that proposed structures in
navigable waters are potentially unlawful. However, the
authority of the legislature to promote public rights in
public trust areas implies the legal basis for aquaculture
in Massachusetts.
Commonwealth v. Alger (7 Cush. 53, 1851) and Boston
Waterfront Development Corporation v. Commonwealth (393 N.E.
2d 356, 1980), represent divergent methods in which the
legislature may promote public rights in the face of
potentially competing private riparian rights. In the
former case, harbor lines represent a means of protecting a
public right by preventing private development beyond them.
In the latter case, private development of public trust
areas is allowed, with the caveat that the development be
related to a public purpose. Further, the use of the public
trust area is limited to the express intent under which the
authority to use it was granted.
This latter case is analogous of aquaculture in
Massachusetts. While different degrees of private rights
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are conferred by wharfing statutes (fee simple title) and
aquaculture legislation (leases), both are intended to serve
public interests. In the case of aquaculture, the addition
of spawn to the public shellfishery represents a
contribution to the public right in shellfishing.
Nonetheless, the SJC has ruled that the public trust
doctrine is inextinguishable. Therefore, aquaculture is
subject to the public rights in fishing, fowling, and
navigation, except in the case of the enclosure of private
tideflats. In this case, aquaculture may be excluded by the
private riparian proprietor.
D. Private Riparian Rights: Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court
Private riparian rights are a special class of rights
that are vested in ownership of private riparian property.
While the scope of private riparian rights may vary between
states, it is commonly accepted that they include:
1. The right to have the water remain in place and
to retain, as nearly as possible, its natural
character.
2. The right of access, including:
a) the right to maintain contact with
the body of water
b) the right to accretions
c) the first right to purchase adjacent
submerged land if it is sold to the
state
d) if filling of submerged land is
permitted by the state, the preferential
right to fill adjacent submerged land
e) the right to draw nets onto the shore
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f) the preferential right to secure
ferry franchises
3. Subject to reasonable restrictions, the right
to wharf out to the navigable portion of the body
of water
4. The right of free use of the water immediately
adjoining the property for the transaction of such
business associated with wharves or other
structures (Kalo, 1990, p.120).
While a comprehensive discussion of these rights is beyond
the scope of this study, two issues related to private
riparian rights in Massachusetts are discussed as they have
a potential relationship to aquaculture on Cape Cod: 1)
establishing title in private tideflats; 2) rules for
dividing private tideflats. The following cases are limited
to these issues.
1. Establishing Title in Private Tideflats
Because riparian proprietors may own tideflats adjacent
to their upland property in fee simple, such tideflats
possess characteristics of real property. A fundamental
characteristic of real property is that it may be subdivided
and sold as separate parcels. In a comment from the first
case in this section, the SJC upheld this principle
regarding private tideflats in Massachusetts:
II (a riparian proprietor) may sell his upland
without the flats, or the flats, or any part
thereof without the upland" (Storer v. Freeman 6
Mass. (6 Tyng) 437, 1810).
Thus, it is erroneous to assume that all tideflats in
Massachusetts that are adjacent to private riparian
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property, are owned by the upland proprietor. While the
presumption of law under the Colony Ordinance of 1647 is
that private riparian property includes title to the
adjacent tideflats, specific wording in a title deed may
alienate the one from the other. This is shown in Storer v.
Freeman 6 Mass. (6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 437, 181C}.
The question in Storer v. Freeman 6 Mass. (6 Mass. (6
Tyng) 437, 181C} was whether the defendant's act of entering
tideflats adjacent to the plaintiff's riparian property
constituted a trespass. In deciding for the defendant, the
SJC discussed the effect of the wording of a deed under
which the plaintiff acquired title to the upland parcel.
The inclusion of the phrase "to the sea-shore" was decisive:
" ... we shall for shore substitute flats. The land
described will then extend to the flats, and not
be bounded by the flats. On this substitution the
construction is manifest. The land conveyed
extends to the flats, but not over them; and
flats, being bound of the land conveyed, are not a
part of it. Thus, by a strict and technical
construction of the description of the land
conveyed, we are satisfied that no part of the
flats passed by the first deed" (Storer v. Freeman
6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 439, 181C}.
It is important to note that the terms shore or seashore
describe tideflats. The SJC cited a high authority in
establishing this point:
"This question is largely considered by Lord
Hale ...his definition of the sea-shore is "that
ground that is between the ordinary high water
mark and the low water mark" (Storer v. Freeman 6
Mass. (6 Tyng) 439, 181C}.
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Because the location of the shoreline changes daily with the
tide, the land that lies between the high water line and the
low water line constitutes the shore.
In Valentine v. Piper (22 pick. 85, 1839) the SJC
addressed a demandant's claim to tideflats on two points: 1)
can private proprietorship in riparian land be established
in the absence of a title deed; 2) if affirmed, are the
adjacent tideflats included? Regarding the question of
title in the upland parcel, the SJC found for the claimant
under the principle of adverse possession1o :
"Where a great number of circumstances concur,
such as a peaceable possession of an estate, the
presence of those, who upon any other hypothesis
would have an adverse title, without claim, all
tending to show an undisputed ownership on the
part of those who set up such non-appearing grant,
they have been considered as presenting so strong
a presumption of fact, that a deed has been
executed, that is allowed to stand as proof of
such deed" (Valentine v. Piper 22 pick. 93, 1839)
The second question was settled in favor of the claimant
under the previously discussed principle of the Colony
Ordinance of 1647. However, the SJC also distinguished a
proviso under which the principle of the Colony Ordinance of
1647 operates in conveying tideflats to private riparian
property:
"It is true, that an owner may separate his upland
from his flats, by alienating the one, without the
other. But such a conveyance is to be proved, not
presumed, and therefore ordinarily proof of title
in the upland thus bounded, carries with it title
in the flats" (Valentine v. Piper 22 Pick. 94,
1839).
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This showed that the establishment of a private title in
riparian property in Massachusetts is sufficient to
establish a title in the adjacent tideflats.
In Niles v. Patch (13 Gray, 254,257, 1859), the SJC
established that in a title deed, the meaning of the word
"beach" is equivalent to the meaning of the word "shore."ll
That is, the word beach is understood to describe tideflats.
The objective of this case was to determine the boundaries
of a parcel of riparian property that possessed a valid
title deed. The SJC decided that the upland property did
not include the adjacent tideflats as it was described as
bounded "by the beach."
What distinguishes this case from Storer v. Freeman (6
Mass. (6 Tyng) 435, 1810) is the SJC's further comment
regarding other terms in a title deed that would include
ownership in tideflats:
"Had the term been "sea," or "salt water", or "bay
or harbor," it might have brought the grant within
the operation of the colony ordinance, and carried
the beach or flats, if the grantor owned it."
(Niles v. Patch 13 Gray, 254, 257, 1859).
An examination of this case and Storer v. Freeman (6 Mass.
(6 Tyng) 435, 1810) reveals guidelines for establishing
whether private riparian property that is held under a valid
instrument includes adjacent tideflats. In the case of
deeds that contain nouns describing tideflats, ownership is
conditional and based upon the construction of the
prepositional phrase in which the noun occurs. In the case
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of deeds that contain nouns describing bodies of water,
ownership is certain.
Another issue related to establishing title in private
tideflats is determining the seaward extent of ownership in
such tideflats. In East Boston Co. v. Commonwealth (89 N.E.
Rep. 236, 1909) the SJC was asked to clarify the language in
a colonial grant of riparian land that was related to this
issue. Whilw the grant was clear in conveying fee simple
title in certain tideflats, it was ambiguous regarding the
location of their seaward boundary:
"Noddle's Island is granted to Samuel Maverick to
enjoy, to him and his heirs forever, yielding and
paying yearly at the General Court, to the
Governor for the time being, either a fat wether,
a fat hog, or forty shillings in money ... It is
declared that the flats round about Nodle's Island
do belong to Nodle's Island to the ordinary lowe
water marke" (1 Mass. Col. Rec. 291, in; East
Boston Co. v. Commonwealth 89 N.E. Rep. 236,
1909) .
The SJC referred the problem of interpreting the meaning of
the term "ordinary lowe water mark" to a Master's
discretion. In answering, the Master cited the Colony
Ordinance of 1647:
"The line of low-water, like the line of high
water, is gradually and constantly changing from
day to day in different parts of the month, and in
different parts of the year, from the highest
spring tides to the lowest neap tides. If the
distinction intended is between extreme low-water
mark and the ordinary or common line of low-water,
having reference to all times and seasons, the
only way of reaching the correct result is to take
the average of the low tides, which gives us the
line of mean low water. The use of the word
"ordinary" distinguished this grant from the
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